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This study answers two questions brought by internet technology improvement in 
industrial organization literature. The first essay, “Customer Poaching, Coupon Trading 
and Consumer Arbitrage”, relaxes the no consumer arbitrage assumption and studies the 
impacts of coupon trading on equilibrium prices, promotion intensities (frequency and 
depth) and profits. The results show that: (i) firms never have incentive to distribute 
defensive coupons; (ii) a larger fraction of coupon traders among consumers or higher 
distribution costs reduce the attractiveness of couponing, and firms respond by l wering 
their (offensive) promotion frequency and depth; (iii) when the cost of distributing 
coupons increases, firms respond by sending fewer offensive coupons, but of higher 
face value; (iv) increase in the fraction of coupon traders and increase in coupon 
distribution cost both lead to higher equilibrium prices and profits. 
The second essay, “Post-Sale Low Price Guarantee and Price Fluctuation”, 
explains the cyclical price fluctuation by the combination of firm’s self post-sale low 
price guarantees and its intertemporal pricing policy. An empirical analysis based on 
weekly price data from Best Buy and Circuit City shows that there is a negative 
relationship between each firm’s current price change and its previous price change. 
This is consistent with my theory that firms may use an intertemporal pricing policy that 
causes price fluctuation over time comparing to the existing literature that usually 







Industrial organization is usually defined as a field of economics that studies the 
strategic behavior of firms, structure of firms and markets, and their interactions. An 
important topic of industrial organization is price discrimination. The commonly 
observed types are second and third degree price discrimination.1 In the past fifteen 
years2, technology development, especially internet development, has had dramatic 
effects on both sides of a market (firms and consumers). This development not only has 
significantly changed firm price discrimination strategies, enriched firm instruments of 
price discrimination and information collecting; but also has influenced consumer 
market behavior, as well as market structure.  
On the firm side, the development of the internet may either increase market 
efficiency or decrease market efficiency. On the one hand, better informati n allows 
firms to offer products that are better suited for consumers, which in turns increases 
market efficiency. Examples can be found in product customization literature like 
Bernhardt et al. (2006). On the other hand, internet development facilitates firms to 
price discriminate, and this price discrimination sometimes is associated with 
inefficiency. Examples can be found in coupon literature such as Liu and Serfes (2004).  
On the consumer side, one advantage brought by the development of technology 
is that it enables consumers to acquire abundant information at a much lower cost. This 
                                                
1  Extended literature and definitions are given in Chapter II. 
2 Commercialization of internet started in mid 1990s. 
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information can be categorized into two types: price information and non-price 
information.  Better price information enables consumers to find better prices; and 
better non-price information enables consumers to find better matched products. As a 
consequence, consumer welfare usually increases. 
Chapter II of this study provides a more extensive theoretical and related 
empirical literature review. 
I.1. Importance of the Study 
In spite of extensive studies on price discrimination, there are still some open 
questions, especially when considering new firm and consumer behavior brought by 
technology improvement. Due to the development of the internet, both sides of the 
market (firms and consumers) can now acquire abundant information at a lower cost 
compared to decades ago. This has significantly affected firm strategies and consumer 
behavior, and has brought new questions in the study of price discrimination. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to address two of these issues: coupon competition when 
consumer arbitrage is allowed, and cyclical price fluctuation over time when post-sale 
low price guarantee is adopted. 
Theoretical economists have explored firm promotion strategies through 
couponing or other similar ways from a wide range of perspectives. However, coupon 
trading, an important phenomenon that may affect firms’ couponing strategies, is 
ignored in this literature. In the past, the time cost or hassle cost of collecting coupons 
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and especially trading coupons3 was prohibitively high. Coupon trading activity among 
consumers is not as popular as today and thus can be ignored without causing a 
significant inconsistency with the real world. However, due to the improvement of the 
internet, for following reasons, coupon trading has become more and more popular 
among consumers, and thus cannot be ignored any more. 
1st. The cost of collecting coupons has been dramatically lowered.  
Comparing to the past when coupons are usually distributed in the form of printed 
paper, nowadays, many firms distribute coupons through the internet, and coupons are 
usually in the form of electronic documents (usually PDF files), or even just aset of 
code. The innovation in the forms of coupon has significantly eased the way of 
collecting coupons.  
2nd. The cost of trading coupons has been lowered. 
Following the innovation of coupon formats, consumers do not have to trade the 
printed physical coupon face to face any more, instead, they can finish the trading by a 
simple email. This not only lowers the transaction cost of finishing the trading, but also 
releases the limitation of finding potential buyers and sellers. A potential coupon 
buyer/seller doesn’t have to be a local resident near a seller/buyer; rath  she could live 
anywhere in the world since they can finish the trading process online.  
3rd. Many websites have been developed to facilitate trading. 
In the past fifteen years, many websites and online forums have been set up to 
facilitate trading among consumers. Besides the most well known website E-Bay, there 
                                                
3 This may come from the cost of finding a potential coupon buyer or seller, and cost of 
negotiating a transaction price. 
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are numerous websites and forums that help consumers to trade coupons and other 
products, such as E-Junkie.com, Craigslist.org, and so on. The emergence of these 
websites has diminished the cost of finding potential traders dramatically. Overall, the 
improvement in the internet has made coupon trading very easy today. And coupon 
trading, an important behavior among some consumers, which may affect firm 
competition strategies, certainly cannot be ignored in coupon competition or other 
similar promotion literature any more.  
Based on existing coupon competition literature, my thesis incorporates consumer 
coupon trading behavior into firm coupon competition. This change allows us to study 
the effect of coupon trading on firm coupon competition strategies. In short, this study 
fills a gap in the coupon competition literature. 
The other important consequence of the development of internet is that consumers 
can get abundant information at low cost nowadays. Since many stores (brick & motor 
stores or pure online stores) have started their online business, it’s much easier for 
consumers to collect product information than ever before, especially for the price 
information. In order to compare prices across stores or track prices over time, 
consumers can simplify click some buttons on a computer, rather than drive or walk to 
the brick & motor stores. This has significant effect on firms’ pricing strategies.   
A variety of literature has been developed to explain price dispersion in a vertical 
dimension that is over time.4 A crucial assumption made in this literature is that 
consumers can only buy early at a high price or late at a low price. This assumption, 
though it may still be true in some circumstances, should be revised since many fir s 
                                                
4 See Stokey (1979) and Nair (2007) for example. 
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today adopt a low price guarantee policy (Hereafter LPG). One way to categorize LPG 
is to divide it into two groups: LPG across stores and LPG over time.5 Th  LPG across 
stores has been extensively studied from different aspects, theoretically and empirically. 
Salop (1986) uses theoretical model to explain how LPG could be used as an instrument 
to achieve collusion among stores. Manez (2006) empirically shows that LPG could be 
used as a signal of low price. However, the latter, LPG over time, has drawn reltively 
little attention from economists. My thesis fills this gap by examining LPG over time, 
and its effect on firms’ pricing strategy.  
I.2. Objectives of the Study 
In order to fill these two gaps, my study is presented in two separate essays. The 
first essay develops a theoretical model, in which coupon trading among consumers is 
allowed. The effects of coupon trading on firm competitive behavior are examined. The 
second essay first presents a theoretical model to examine firms’ post-sale elf LPG 
policy and its effect on firms’ intertemporal pricing strategy, profit, consumer surplus 
and social welfare. Then I use weekly data from Best Buy and Circuit City o 
empirically examine the theoretical model.  
I.3. Results of the Study 
The third chapter, “Customer Poaching, Coupon Trading and Consumer 
Arbitrage”, deals with firm coupon competition when coupon trading among consumers 
is presented. The results indicate that coupon trading among consumers has significant 
                                                
5 There are some stores adopt a LPG which is a combination of these two. For example, Staples 




effect on firm competitive behavior. Specifically, when the fraction of coupon traders 
increases, and when the cost of distributing coupons increases, competition is released. 
Competition through coupon distribution is a prisoner’s dilemma game.  
The fourth chapter, “Post-Sale Low Price Guarantees and Price Fluctuation”, 
investigates firms’ LPG policy and its effect on firms’ pricing strategies. The essay 
finds that it is profitable for firms to adopt post-sale LPG policy. And further, with th s 
policy firms may change their prices periodically to price discriminate the consumers 
with high cost of requesting price matching after purchase. This intertemporal pricing 
policy causes the commonly observed phenomenon of price fluctuation over time. 
Weekly data from Best Buy and Circuit City indicate that each firm’s price change is 
significantly correlated with its own previous change. This provides some empirical 
evidence for the theoretical prediction at some degree.  
I.4. Organization of the Study 
Chapter II presents a summary of the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
of industrial organization. Chapter III presents the first essay, “Customer Poaching, 
Coupon Trading and Consumer Arbitrage”. Chapter IV presents the second essay, 
“Post-Sale Low Price Guarantees and Price Fluctuation”. Finally, Chapter V lays out a 
summary of the study and suggests possible extensions. In the next chapter, I 








This chapter provides an overview of the landmark theoretical and related 
empirical studies of industrial organization that focus on the price discriminat on 
literature in the following areas: coupon distribution competition, price dispersion, 
intertemporal price change, and low-price guarantee. Section II.1 gives an overview of 
price discrimination that provides the conceptual background for the study. Section II.2 
outlines the literature related to coupon distribution competition. Section II.3 introduces 
the literature related to price dispersion, intertemporal price strategy nd LPG.  
II.1. Price Discrimination 
Overview and Taxonomy 
Price discrimination has existed and has been studied for a long time. The 
possible earliest economist to study price discrimination is Jules Dupuit, a French 
economist-engineer. As pointed out by F.Y.Edgeworth (1910) and emphasized by 
Robert Ekelund Jr. (1970), Dupuit is believed to be the earliest, and the highest 
authority on the theory of price discrimination at that time. Regardless of its di ferent 
types, price discrimination can be simply defined as identical products (goods or 
services) provided at different prices. Based on the degree to which product providers 
can charge different prices, Pigou (1932) categorize price discrimination in o first, 
second and third degree price discrimination.  
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In the first degree price discrimination, price varies by customers. Thi is not very 
commonly observed in real world, because it requires the product provider has the 
ability to identify every single customer and the power to charge different prices to 
different customers. These two conditions are difficult to satisfy in many circumstances. 
One possible example could be repeated auctions for the same products. Thinking about 
an E-Bay seller selling multiple identical products through auction, each winning bid 
for the product could be different.6 Therefore during this process, the same products are 
provided at different prices.  
Second degree price discrimination is when providers are incapable of 
differentiating different types of consumers. Therefore they provide diffrent supply 
schedules and rely on consumers to sort themselves by choosing different options. The 
most commonly observed second degree price discrimination is that price varies 
according to quantity sold. As one can easily find, the price of one-gallon milk is 
usually less than the twice of the price of half-gallon milk.  
Third degree price discrimination occurs when providers are capable of 
differentiating and charging different prices between consumer classes (in the most 
extreme case, price varies by individual customer, and this becomes first degree price 
discrimination). Examples of third degree price discrimination could be senior discunt 
or member discount.  
As one can easily see from the above descriptions, these categories are not 
mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. Therefore Ivan Png (2002) sugge ts an 
                                                
6 Here the seller still cannot extract the entire surplus from the consumers. She can only charge 
different prices depending on the willingness to pay. 
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alternative taxonomy. Nevertheless, Pigou’s taxonomy is still the prevailing taxonomy 
in industrial organization literature. Among the three types of price discriminations 
defined by Pigou, the most commonly seen and studied are second and third degree 
price discrimination. I will start with second degree price discrimination. 
Second Degree Price Discrimination 
For second degree price discrimination, providers offer different schedules to let 
consumers sort themselves into different groups. Consumers information plays a crucial 
role in firms’ optimal price schedule determination. Stole (1995) discusses second 
degree price discrimination in oligopoly market where firms’ products are spatially 
differentiated and consumers may have brand preference or quality preferenc. The 
paper finds that the optimal pricing schedules depend importantly on the type of private 
information the consumer has. When competition increases, quality distortion, price, 
and quality dispersion decrease. Armstrong (1999) discusses a model in which multi-
products monopoly facing consumers with unobservable tastes. 
A common seen second price discrimination is quantity discount. Goldman and 
Sibley (1984) give an example of non-uniform price based on quantity purchased. 
Before their work, existing literature about quantity discount usually focus n two-part 
non-uniform pricing. Their paper goes further by discussing arbitrary non-uniform 
pricing policies. In their paper, consumer demands are heterogeneous, and firms only 
know the distribution of the demand but not the demand of any exact consumer. The 
firm thus chooses an optimal non-uniform pricing policy based on quantity purchased. 
They find that this discrimination will in general increase welfare levels, and non-
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uniform price schedules will differ qualitatively when income effects are important 
from when they are not.  
Besides the quantity discount discussed above, other characteristics could also be 
used as a sorting instrument. Chiang and Spatt (1982) develop a model, in which 
consumers are different in their valuations of waiting time to get the product. Knowing 
this, the monopoly price discriminates part of the market by bundling its products with 
different waiting time. They find that deadweight loss, consumer surplus and output 
between single-price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous.  
Sometimes, it is profitable for providers to offer different schedules to price 
discriminate part of the market; sometimes it is not profitable to do so. Diamond (1987) 
looks at a model with two classes of consumers—divided according to their willingness 
to pay—high type and low type. The model is in continuous time with a unit of flow of 
new consumers into the market. He finds that the equilibrium can have a single price or 
a pair of prices. In a two-price equilibrium, the lower price equals the lower willingness 
to pay of the low type, and the higher price is the reservation price of the high type.  
Third Degree Price Discrimination 
For third degree price discrimination, providers are able to sort different groups of 
consumers based on some of their characteristics. This difference can be categorized 
into two types: vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation.  
In vertical differentiation, consumers have the same preference ordering but 
different valuations of some characteristics of the product. A typical example is quality. 
Most (if not all) agree higher quality product is preferable, but only the consumers who 
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value the quality high enough are willing to pay a premium to purchase a high quality
product, while others do not value the quality high enough will pay low price and get 
low quality. This quality difference market could be automobile market (BMW versus 
Hyundai) or software market (Professional edition versus home edition). Shaked and 
Sutton (1982) look at a three stage model in which number of firms, product qualities, 
and prices are endogenous determined sequentially. They find the only perfect 
equilibrium exists when there are exact two firms, and they offer distinct quali ies.  
In horizontal differentiation, consumers have different tastes. An obvious example 
can be found in the soft drink market—Pepsi versus Coke. This horizontal 
differentiation is generally captured by consumers’ heterogeneous locations. A 
benchmark model in horizontal differentiation literature is Hotelling’s model (1929). In 
the paper, Hotelling consider a “linear city” of length 1. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed along the line. Two shops, located at the two ends of the line, sell identical 
products. Consumers have unit demand. Besides the price of the product, they have to 
pay a transportation cost, which is a linear function of the distance between the 
consumer’s location and the location of the firm that the consumer shops at. Hotelling’s 
model has been broadly discussed and cited. Generally speaking, there are two strams
of results: minimum differentiation, in which firms will minimize their difference; and 
maximum differentiation, in which firms will maximize their differenc.  
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) examine the principle of minimum differentiation from 
Hotelling’s model under various conditions. They find that of the models they studied, 
minimum differentiation is a property only of those in which firms pursue a strategy of 
zero conjectural variation and where the number of firms is restricted to two. When a 
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new firm enters a market, or when an existing firm relocates, there is a strong tendency 
for that firm to locate as close as possible to another firm. This behavior tends to create 
local clusters of firms in many equilibrium and disequilibrium situations. The princi le 
of minimum differentiation is a special case of the principle of local clustering when the 
number of firms in the market is restricted to two. D’Aspremont et al. (1979) reexamine 
Hotelling’s model and the so-called principle of minimum differentiation, and find that 
no equilibrium price solution will exist when both sellers are not far enough from each 
other when using linear transportation cost as in Hotelling’s model. They then find with 
quadratic transportation cost, firms will move away from each other as far apossible. 
Economides (1986) under the Hotelling’s model structure, discusses a set of different 
transportation costs by let the transportation cost f(d)=da, where 1<=a<=2. He finds that 
in general neither minimal nor maximal differentiation is correct; rathe there exists a 
range of a value such that the perfect equilibrium locations are interior pointsof the 
product space. 
Other Price Discrimination Literature 
There is also many literature related to intertemporal price discrimination. A 
general idea of this intertemporal price discrimination is that firms charge different 
prices over time to price discriminate part of the market.7 As contrary to the usually 
predicted monotonical price decreasing over time in existed literature, my second essay 
predict a price fluctuation over time. 
While major literature discusses second or third degree price discrimination in a 
final good market, Katz (1987) looks at third degree price discrimination in 
                                                
7  Detailed information about this literature is provided in II.3.  
13 
 
intermediate good market. His paper develops a model in which there is a monopolist 
who is an intermediate good supplier. The intermediate good is an input into the 
production of a homogeneous final good that is sold in a set of independent local 
markets. The author finds that results are different from the final goods market. The 
factor that price discrimination may raise prices charged to both types of buyers shows 
that the demand interdependencies and possibility of integration can have powerful 
effects on the equilibrium outcome. Price discrimination can decrease consumer surplus 
and welfare but it can also prevent socially inefficient integration.  
II.2. Coupon Trading Literature 
Coupon Competition 
Coupons have been used as an instrument to achieve second or third degree price 
discrimination for a long time. Based on the distribution method, coupons can be 
categorized as mass distribution or target coupon. For mass distribution coupons, each 
consumer generally has equal chance to get the coupon, and based on his/her 
characteristics (for example, time cost or hassle cost of using the coupon) decides 
whether to use the coupon or not. In this case, coupons are used as an instrument to 
facilitate second degree price discrimination. For target coupons, firms send coupons to 
a specific group or specific groups of consumers. These consumers, with the coupon, 
can get the product at a lower price. In this case, coupon is used as an instrument to 
achieve third degree price discrimination.  
Early studies consider the use of coupons as a device to create market 
segmentation due to consumer self-selection (mass media coupons). For example, in 
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Narasimhan (1984), couponing enables price discrimination providing a lower price to a 
particular segment of consumers while keeping the price high for others. With the 
availability of more consumer information, firms can rely less on consumer self-
selection and more on targeted coupons (see Shaffer and Zhang (1995) for examples of 
such practices). Targeted coupons are mostly modeled as offensive coupons, i.e., to 
poach rival firms’ loyal customers (Shaffer and Zhang (1995), Bester and Petrakis 
(1996), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) etc.). 
The study most relevant to my dissertation chapter three is Bester and Petrakis 
(1996). They look at a duopoly model where consumers have preferences for one brand 
over the other.  Each firm can send out coupons to consumers who prefer the other 
firm’s product.  They show that couponing intensifies competition between the firms, 
and the equilibrium prices and profits are lower than when no coupons are offered. 
Since couponing leads to a prisoners’ dilemma game, an increase in the cost of coupon 
distribution would lead to higher prices and lower consumer surplus. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) look at a two-period game where in the second 
period. Firms can separate consumers who bought from them in period 1 from those 
consumers who did not. Consequently, each firm can poach the customers of their 
competitors by sending them coupons to induce them to switch. They also find that 
poaching leads to lower prices. They also investigate the efficiency of long-term 
contracts or short-term contracts. 
In the previous two papers, a poaching firm sends the same coupons to all of its 
rival’s customers. The coupons are different in Liu and Serfes (2004) and Shaffer and 
Zhang (1995, 2002). In Liu and Serfes, both firms send coupons of different face value.  
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This is because firms have detailed information which enables them to segment 
consumers into various groups. In Shaffer and Zhang (1995), each firm offers only one 
type of coupons, but it can choose to send coupons to only a portion  of the customers 
(partial  couponing),  since each firm has the ability  to identify and target  each
individual  consumer. The reason firms do partial couponing is because some 
consumers’ preferences are so strong that the poaching firm can’t attract them by 
sending coupons.  The game is still a prisoners’ dilemma game in which the net effect 
of coupon targeting is the coupon distribution cost plus the discounts given to 
redeemers. Only when firms are asymmetric, the game may not be a prisoners’ dilemma 
with one-to-one promotions (Shaffer and Zhang 2002), since there is also a market 
share effect. The firm with the higher-quality product may gain from one-to-one 
promotions at the cost of the lower-quality product firm. 
Consumer Arbitrage 
There have been few studies analyzing resale or consumer arbitrage, and they 
typically consider only monopoly. In Anderson and Ginsburg (1999), consumers differ 
in two dimensions: willingness to pay and arbitrage cost. In their setup, a monopolist 
can sell its product in two countries. It may sell in the second country even if there is no 
local demand, with the sole purpose of discriminating across consumers with different 
arbitrage costs in the first country. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) consider a monopolist’s 
problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms when resale is possible. They 
find that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochasti  selling procedure.   
The auction literature has also considered how resale affects bidding. In particular, the 
information revealed in a primary auction market and changes in bidder participation 
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patterns can create inefficiencies that affect the revenue ranking of standard auction 
formats when there is an option to resale in a secondary market. Zheng (2002) 
investigates the design of seller- optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to 
resell the good, and characterizes the sufficient and necessary condition for sincere
bidding with resale. Haile (2003) considers how resale opportunities affect bidders’ 
valuations and finds that the secondary market can benefit the initial seller if th  resale 
seller can extract a sufficient share of the resale surplus. In our case, there is no pricing 
decision that is conditioned on the bidding outcome of the auction. The efficient re-
allocation of coupons results via English auctions held with no incentive distortions. 
Empirical and Experimental Coupon Literature 
There are many experiments in the literature exploring various effects of firm 
promotion or couponing on consumer psychology and purchasing behavior. Some 
literature discusses adverse effects of promotion or couponing on firm profitability nd 
consumer purchasing behavior. For example, Shor and Oliver (2006), from an 
experiment, find that the diminished likelihood of purchase has adverse effects on 
profitability and offsets any gains from market segmentation. Gonul and Srinivasa  
(1996) find that consumers’ perception of future coupons affects purchase using 158 
weeks disposable diaper data. Some researcher explore the factors that may affect 
coupon usage. Bawa et al. (1997) argue that a person's coupon usage behavior will 
depend not only on his or her inherent coupon proneness or desire to use coupons, but 
also on the attractiveness of the coupons encountered. In Mittal's (1994) paper, he 
claims that consumers' characteristics can determine their attitudes to coupon usage. 
Delvecchio (2005) uses two experiments to explore the effects of relative and absolute 
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promotion value. Buckinx et al. (2003) develop two models to explore factors that 
affect manufacturer and retailer coupon redemption rates.  
II.3. Online Price Dispersion, Over Time Price Change and LPG 
Online Price Dispersion 
Price dispersion always exists in Brick & Motor stores. One major explanation is 
that the price dispersion comes from consumer search cost. Salop (1977) develops a 
model, in which consumers have an expectation of a subjective price distribution and 
heterogeneous search costs. A consumer will calculate an optimal reserve price from the 
price distribution and search cost, and then search the local store until she finds a price 
equals to her reserve price. Knowing this, a monopolist can choose an optimal price 
distribution and allow price discrimination. As pointed out by Bakos (1991, 1997) and 
Smith et al. (1999), since the search cost dramatically drops for online shopping, we 
should observe a price convergence. However, we still observe consistent price 
dispersion online. 
There are four major explanations for online price dispersion. 
(1) Immaturity of markets. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find price dispersion in 
books and CDs market and one of their explanations is immaturity of online market. 
Brown and Goolsbee (2002) investigate the online life insurance market and find that 
price dispersion is large at the beginning but falls as the use of internet spreads. 
However Baylis & Perloff (2002) find that the pattern of price dispersion in their data 
on electronic markets rarely changes over the course of more than one year, which does 
not support price convergence as the market matures.  
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(2) Search cost heterogeneity. After observing 32 online bookstores, Clay et al. 
(2001) find consistent price dispersion, and their results suggest that many consumers 
may not be engaging in search, despite its low cost and significant payoff.  
(3) Mixed price strategy. Clemons et al. (2002) claim that firms can ease price 
competition by adopting a mixed price strategy after they observed the online travel 
market. But Baylis & Perloff (2002) find that online price rankings in their sample do 
not change their strategy much.  
(4) Service premium. As pointed out by Lynch & Ariely (2000), online shopping 
lowers the cost of acquiring price information, which will increase price sensitivity. 
They develop an experiment for online wine shopping, and find that for differentiated 
products like wines, lowering the cost of search for quality information reduces pri  
sensitivity. Grover & Ramanlal (1999) also find that providing more detailed product 
information could increase the reservation price for some consumers. However, Pan et 
al. (2002) find that online service quality accounted for only a small percentage of price 
dispersion based on an empirical analysis of 105 online retailers comprising 6,739 price 
observations for 581 items in eight product categories. 
When we observe the price patterns of Best Buy, Circuit City, Office Depot, 
Office Max, and Staples, we found prices are not only different from store to store, but 




Over Time Price Change 
A main theory used to explain each store’s own price change over time is 
intertemporal pricing strategy. As pointed out by Elmaghraby & Keskinocak (2003), in 
recent years, due to technological improvement, there has been an increasing adoption 
of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries. Stokey (1979) proposed a 
monopoly model when both sides of the market have complete information about prices. 
Given that consumers differ from each other in terms of initial reservation prices and 
discount rates, intertemporal pricing can be used as a profitable price discrimination 
instrument if consumers’ reservation prices fall proportionately faster than the firm’s 
production costs. When costs don’t decrease over time or they decrease at the same rate 
as reservation prices, a monopolist prefers to use a single price.  
With incomplete information, Landsberger & Meilijson (1985) considered a 
monopoly market, in which the firm only knows consumers’ distribution rather than the 
exact reservation prices. They find that in order to make intertemporal price 
discrimination profitable, consumers with high reservation prices must be discouraged 
from waiting until low prices are offered. To generate these incentives, the monopolist 
may have to delay considerably the lowered-price sales. The larger the consumer 
discount rate, the easier it is to discourage consumers with high reservation prices from 
waiting. Rustichini and Villamil (1996) go even further in the strand of incomplete 
information. They discuss a one buyer/one seller market, in which the buyer’s value is 
private information and changes randomly through time according to a Markov chain 
with positive serial correlation. A firm uses its price to explore the buyer’s valuation 
over time. Its intertemporal pricing strategy weighs the cost of attempting to learn the 
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buyer’s value (which may decrease current profit) versus its benefit (which may 
increase its future profit). In this literature, the profitability of intertemporal pricing 
strategy relies on the different discount rates between firms and consumers.  
In the strand of literature that both firms and consumers share the same discount 
factor, Rodriguez and Locay (2002) present two different models in which both firm 
and consumers share the same discount factor. In their first model, demand is stocha tic 
but consumers are uncertain about product availability in the future, so that those with 
higher willingness to pay prefer to pay higher prices today than face the risk that the 
product may sellout. Their second model uses Leibenstein’s “snob effect”8 to generate a 
desire on the part of the more enthusiastic consumers to buy early, when the good is 
more exclusive. Nair (2007) presents an empirical application to the market for vide -
games in the US. The results indicate that consumer forward-looking behavior has a 
significant effect on a firm’s optimal pricing. Hosken and Reiffen (2004) examine 
grocery retail price variation across a range of goods and regions of the Uni ed States. 
They find that typical grocery product has a regular price and most deviations from that 
regular price are downward. 
Contrary to this literature relying on monopoly market, Levin et al. (2009) present 
an intertemporal pricing model in an oligopolistic market. Nevertheless, all this 
intertemporal pricing literature is based on an assumption that some consumers are 
willing to wait and buy in the future; while this assumption should be revised if firms
use post-sale self LPGs. Because with the post-sale self LPGs, consumers can buy early 
                                                
8 The satisfaction a consumer derives from a product e reases with the number of consumers that 
have consumed the good at the moment of purchase 
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and request a price match later if the price is lowered. This gives consumer no incentive 
to wait and buy. 9
Low Price Guarantee 
A first impression about LPG is that it must favor consumers in the sense that 
consumers are given an opportunity to buy from their favorite store at a lower pric . 
However as a number of researches have shown, LPG sometimes may hurt consumers. 
Existing literature explains LPG in three streams: collusive device, price discrimination 
tool, and low price signal10.  Salop (1986) points out the LPG could be used as an 
instrument to facilitate collusion. A simple version of his model has two firms selling a 
homogeneous product to fully informed consumers. Without LPG, Bertrand 
competition leads to both firms pricing at marginal cost. With LPG, however, both 
firms price at the monopoly level. Logan and Lutter (1989) find that the result is robu t 
to heterogeneous products and an asymmetric duopoly. Empirically, Arbatskaya et l. 
(2006), using data on retail tire prices, find firms with price-matching guarantees tend to 
have weakly higher advertised prices than firms with no guarantees; whereas firms with 
price-beating guarantees tend to have weakly lower advertised prices than firms with no 
guarantees. In the strand of literature using LPG as price discrimination tool, Png and 
Hirshleifer (1987) look at a duopoly market, in which there are two types of consumers: 
Locals with elastic demand who will request price matching if possible, and tourists, 
who have perfect inelastic demand as long as the price is below their reservation price, 
and will not request price match. They find that in equilibrium, LPG is used as an 
                                                
9  Some consumers may still wait and buy either because the hassle cost of requesting price match 
is too high for them, or they think the price will not be lowered within the period of price matching. 
10 Moorthy and Winter (2006) summarize a nice table for the comparison among these three. 
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instrument to price discriminate the tourists. Corts (1996) looks at an oligopolistic 
market, and finds LPG is used as a price discrimination tool rather than a collusion 
device. LPG may raise or lower equilibrium prices. The relatively new explanation 
about LPG is using it as a signal of low price. Moorthy and Zhang (2006) investigat  
LPG under vertical differentiation structure, and find offering LPG is a signal of low 
price and low service, which is a way of branding the retailer to uninformed consumers. 
Moorthy and Winter (2006) develop a duopoly model in which firms marginal costs are 
random draws. They find LPG may be used as an instrument to signal low price. They 
provide empirical evidence from 46 retailers in U.S. and Canada to support the 
signaling explanation. Manez (2006) collects prices data from three superstores, and 
finds that LPG is offered by the firm with the lowest price. This indicates th  LPG here 
is used as a low price signal. There are some researches investigating firm post-sale self 
low price guarantee policy (hereafter SLPG). For example, Chen and Liu (2009) study 
the effects of SLPG on price competition among major consumer electronics retailers 
and find SLPG is pro-competitive. Cooper (1986) find SLPG soften competition in a 
two-period duopoly heterogeneous products model. Schnitzer (1994) examines SLPG 
on collusion in a two-period homogeneous durable goods market and finds SLPG can 
facilitate collusion at limited degree. 11 
My second essay provides a theoretical model to explain the relationship between 
firm pricing strategy and firm post-sale low price guarantee. I find SLPG can be used as 
a price discrimination tool. 
 
                                                




CUSTOMER POACHING, COUPON TRADING AND CONSUMER 
ARBITRAGE 
III.1. Introduction 
There is a large literature on price discrimination.12 A common assumption made 
in this literature (except for a few studies) is that consumers cannot engage i  
arbitrage.13 In traditional markets, it is costly for a consumer to locate another potential 
buyer of the same product and then trade. In that sense, the no-arbitrage assumption, 
while not entirely true, may be realistic. However, this assumption is increasingly 
violated in the digital economy. First, it is easier to buy products cheap and resell for a 
profit online (e.g. Ebay.com), since the direct “consumer-to-consumer” markets are 
more developed and information can be easily exchanged on the internet. Moreover, 
one of the commonly used methods to achieve price discrimination is to target 
consumers with coupons, and coupons can be easily traded. In the case of online 
shopping, all that consumers need is a coupon code. Not surprisingly, more and more 
coupons are traded online. For a simple example, go to Ebay.com and search under 
                                                
12 A search in EconLit results in 521 papers with “price discrimination” in the titles of the papers. 
13 If a firm offers a menu of various qualities of products available to all consumers, and relies 
on consumers to self-select based on their characteristics, then consumers have no incentive to 
engage in arbitrage and the assumption is not needed. However, if the menu includes offers of 
different quantities, or if the firm give different options to different consumers, then the no 
arbitrage assumption is needed. 
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“coupon,” one can find over 20,000 (not counting multiple coupons in one listing) of 
them for sale.14 
In this paper we relax the no consumer arbitrage assumption by allowing coupons 
to be traded. Specifically, we assume that some consumers have low hassle cost of 
selling or buying coupons, and we call them coupon traders.15 Other consumers have 
prohibitively high cost of trading coupons and are called non-traders. We assume that 
firms have information (e.g. purchase history) to differentiate between their own loyal 
customers and their rivals’, and thus can price discriminate between them by sending 
coupons to only one group or by sending different coupons to different groups. We 
develop a location model of oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination to 
investigate how prices, promotion intensities and profits change as the fraction of 
coupon traders increases. 
Depending on the method of distribution, coupons can be divided into two types:  
mass media coupons and targeted coupons. Mass media coupons are distributed 
randomly by the firms, and consumers, based on their characteristics, self-select a  to 
whether to collect and use the coupons (Narasimhan 1984). However, with the 
availability of more and more data on actual consumer transactions, and better 
technology to utilize such data, firms do not need to rely exclusively on consumer self-
selection. Instead, they can select shoppers with specific characteristics, and send 
                                                
14 These are only listings of coupons for auction or sale, and not all of them are sold. To get a 
sense of how many are actually sold, we searched for a specific coupon (Staples coupon), and checked 
the 10 listings with the earliest expiration time. We found that 6 of them had bids. One of the 6 
coupons being auctioned is a Staples  $20 off $100 coupon.  It has 4 bids with  less than  2 hours  
left for the  auction,  and the highest  bid is $3.75. 
15 For example, some consumers may be familiar with Ebay and have various accounts already set 
up for transactions there, so the incremental transaction cost of trading coupons on Ebay is minimal. 
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targeted coupons (Shaffer and Zhang 1995). A popular form of targeted coupon is an 
offensive coupon (also called a poaching coupon). Firms send offensive coupons to 
poach rival firm’s loyal customers, i.e., those who will purchase from the rival firm if 
prices are the same.16 The opposite is a defensive coupon. A firm can distribute 
defensive coupons to retain its own loyal customers, who may be poached by rival 
firm’s offensive coupons. 
In this paper, we focus on coupons which are tradable, i.e., carrying no restriction 
on who can use them.17 We allow firms to send offensive coupons and/or defensive 
coupons, but find that firms have incentive to send only offensive coupons. When a 
coupon trader receives a poaching coupon, he will sell this coupon back to the 
couponing firm’s loyal customers, since the latter value the coupon more. In the 
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of this model we find that when the fraction of 
coupon traders increases, firms will promote (send coupons) less frequently and with 
lower coupon face value. This reduces competition, leading to higher prices and profits. 
When coupon distribution cost increases, firms respond by promoting less frequently, 
but with higher coupon face value. Equilibrium prices and profits also go up. Increase  
in  the  fraction  of coupon  traders  and  increase  in  coupon distribution cost both  
                                                
16 This is somewhat similar to “reciprocal dumping” in the trade literature (e.g.  Brander and 
Krugman (1983) and Deltas et. al. (2008)). In both settings, each firm has disadvantage in one market, 
whether it is due to weaker preferences of consumers in that market (our case) or higher transportation 
cost to serve consumers in that market (the reciproal dumping case).  Firms poach each other’s strong 
markets, leading to lower profits for both firms, prisoners’ dilemma. 
17 In practice, some coupons carry restrictions in terms of who can use the coupons.  For example,  
if you receive an offer of a onetime  bonus  by switching  long distance  call service to AT&T,  you 
qualify for the offer only if you are not currently with AT&T.  However, many (if not most) coupons 
carry no restrictions in terms of who can use the coupons.  In the extension, we allow firms the choice to 




discourage firms from sending coupons. Since price discrimination with coupons 
constitutes a prisoners’ dilemma game, equilibrium prices and profits increase. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our model is presented in Section 2, 
and Section 3 contains our main results. In Section 4 we offer some extensions of our 
model and we conclude in Section 5. Section 6 is Appendix. 
III.2. Description of the Model 
Two firms—1and 2—produce competing goods with constant marginal cost, 
which we normalize to zero. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good and is 
willing to pay V. We assume that V is sufficiently high and therefore the market is 
always covered. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the premium they are
willing to pay for their favorite brand. This heterogeneity is captured by a parameter l, 
which represents the consumer’s degree of loyalty. Specifically, a consumer locat d at l
is indifferent between buying from the two firms if and only if l=p1−p2. We assume that 
l is uniformly distributed in the interval [−L, L] with density 1.18 When two firms 
charge the same prices, consumers located at l > 0 will buy from firm 1 and are called 
firm 1’s loyal customers. Similarly, customers with l < 0 are firm 2’s loyal customers.  
The interval [−L, L] is partitioned into two segments:  [−L, 0] and [0, L], 
corresponding to firm 2’s and firm 1’s loyal customers respectively. Firms know which 
segment each consumer is located in, but do not know exactly where in the 
corresponding segment. For example, for someone located at L/2, firms will know that 
                                                
18 A similar model has been used in Shaffer and Zhang (2002) and Liu and Serfes (2006). 
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she is located in the segment [0, L], but not that she is located at L/2.19 There are two 
types of pricing strategies that a firm can adopt in our context: 
Uniform Pricing 
Each consumer on the [−L, L] interval receives the same price. This price is also
called the regular price, which is the price consumers pay without coupons. Let p1 and 
p2 denote the regular prices of the two firms. Without loss of generality, assume that p1 
≥ p2. 
Segment Couponing 
Recall that the two segments are [−L, 0] and [0, L]. Firms can send coupons to 
consumers in one segment but not those in the other segment, or send different coupons 
to different segments. We allow firms to distribute both offensive and defensive 
coupons.20 Let segment 1 denote the interval [−L, 0], and segment 2 the interval [0, L]. 
Let (, ) denote firm 1’s couponing intensity in segment 1, where firm 2’s loyal 
customers are located.21 This means that every consumer in segment 1 has an equal 
probability λ11 of receiving coupons of face value r11 from firm 1.  is called the 
promotion frequency and  is the promotion depth. Following the literature, we 
                                                
19 We assume this exogenous information structure and do not investigate how this structure 
emerges. One can think  of a two-period model where firms can observe purchasing history  but  not 
consumers’ exact willingness to pay for a good, and such information structure would emerge 
endogenously  after  consumers make purchasing decisions in the first period (e.g. Fudenberge and 
Tirole).  In a symmetric  equilibrium  of this  two-period model, consumers  located  on the  interval  [−L, 
0] will buy from firm 2 in the  first period, and those located  on the interval  [0, L] will buy from firm 1. 
Then at the beginning of the second period, for each consumer, firms know whether she bought from it in
period 1. However, firms only know whether consumers bought from them in period 1, but do not know 
their exact locations. 
20 Recall that if firms send coupons to poach rival firm’s loyal customers, such coupons are called 
offensive coupons.  Defensive coupons are sent to retain a firm’s own loyal customers. 
21 The first (second) subscript refers to firm (segment). 
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consider dollars-off coupons instead of percentage-off coupons. Similarly, let (, ) 
denote firm 1’s defensive couponing intensity in segment 2. Note that, if  > 0 and 
=0, then firm 1 is sending offensive coupons alone. Similarly firm 2’s offensive 
couponing intensities are given by (, ) and its defensive couponing intensity are 
given by (, ). When consumers do not use coupons, they will pay either  or , 
depending on which firm they buy from. With coupons, consumers located at segment 
j=1, 2 will pay    if they buy from firm 1, or pay    if they buy from firm 2. 
Next we introduce the cost of distributing coupons. We assume that coupon 
distribution cost is increasing and convex in the promotion effort and the size of the 
segment. In particular, it takes the form of 
for firm i’s promotion effort at 
segment j. If firm i sends out both offensive and defensive coupons, then its total 
promotion cost is 
  
. Consumers incur no cost when using coupons.22   
However, they differ in whether they trade (buy/sell) coupons. A fraction  f them 
have zero cost of trading coupons. We call them coupon traders. If these consumers 
receive coupons, they will either use the coupons or sell them to other consumers who 
value the coupons more.  They may also buy coupons from other customers. The 
remaining 1   fraction have infinite cost of trading coupons and are called coupon 
non-traders.23 
                                                
22 We relax this assumption by introducing coupon non-users in Section 5.1. Our results do not 
change qualitatively with the introduction of coupon non-users. 
23 It’s certainly more realistic to assume a smooth distribution of coupon trading costs and 
endogenize the fraction of coupon traders. Consumers with trading costs below certain level are willing to 
trade coupons—coupon traders, and those with higher coupon trading costs will not—non-traders.  The 
cutoff coupon trading cost will determine the fraction of coupon traders α. Note that, in this setup α and 
equilibrium prices and promotion strategies are intrdependent. For tractability, we assume that α is 
exogenous in this paper, and we reserve the endogenizatio  of α for future research. 
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Our models are related to those in Bester and Petrakis, and Fudenberg and Tirole.  
If we set α=0 and rule out defensive coupons, our model becomes the one in Bester and 
Petrakis (with uniform distribution). If we set   0 and 
  0, our model becomes the 
second period of Fudenberg and Tirole (short-term contracts with uniform distribution). 
The game we will study can be described as follows. 
• Stage 1. Firms, simultaneously and independently, decide their regular 
prices (pi), promotion frequency () and depth (), i, j = 1, 2.24 
• Stage 2. Coupon distribution is realized. Coupon trading then takes place. 
• Stage 3. Consumers make purchasing decisions. If they use coupons, they 
will pay regular price minus the coupon face value. 
We assume that firms are risk neutral and maximize their expected profits. S  
firm i’s problem is to choose , , , ,   1, 2, to maximize its profit, 
max (, , , , , ), ,   1, 2. 
III.3. Analysis 
We first provide a road map for how we solve the game. The consumers can be 
segmented into various groups, depending on whether they are coupon traders and 
whether they receive coupons. We calculate firms’ profits from each group. Then we 
aggregate profits over all groups of consumers net of the coupon distribution cost.  
                                                
24 Similar to Bester and Petrakis, we model the price and promotion strategies as a simultaneous 
game. An alternative way of modeling is a sequential-move game where firms choose one strategy (say 
price) before they choose the other strategy (say promotion strategy). However, it is unclear to us whether 
firms should choose price strategy or promotion strategy first. On the one hand, it is often viewed that 
regular price is a higher level managerial decision and is relatively slow to adjust in practice than 
promotions. On the other hand, we often observe regular price changes while promotion strategy (e.g.  
coupon face value) is relatively stable. 
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Solving the first order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium price, promotion frequency 
and depth.25 
Consumers can be divided into the following groups: 
Type (a):  non-traders with neither firm’s coupon; 
Type (b):  non-traders with only offensive coupons; 
Type (c):  non-traders with only defensive coupons; 
Type (d):  non-traders with both firms’ coupons; 
Type (e):  traders. 
Based on firm i’s promotion effort  (,   1, 2), each consumer in segment j 
has an equal probability,  , of receiving the coupon from firm . Firms maximize their 
expected profits, thus we only need to consider, on average, how many consumers are 
of each type. We start by calculating each firm’s demand and profit from each type of 
consumers, and then add them up to obtain each firm’s overall demand and profit. 
(1) Type (a):  non-traders with neither firm’s coupons 
We start with type (a) consumers, who are depicted in Figure III.1. Consumer 
density are different in [−L, 0] and in [0, L]. First consider consumers on the interval 
[−L, 0]. The fraction of non-traders is 1  . The probability of not receiving firm 1’s 
(offensive) coupon is 1−, and the probability of not receiving firm 2’s (defensive) 
coupons is 1−. Overall the probability of being a non-trader and receiving neither 
                                                
25 First order conditions are necessary but not sufficient. We need to make sure that the solutions 
that we obtain constitute equilibrium strategies (p∗, r∗ and λ∗). Instead of checking whether the Hessian is 
negative semi-definite (which is quite messy), we show that no firm has incentive to unilaterally deviate 
from this profile of strategies. Details are provided in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. 
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firm’s coupon is 1  1  1  . Similarly the fraction of non-traders with 
neither firm’s coupon on the interval [0, L] is1  1  1  . 
Let  denote the location of the marginal consumer, which is defined by           
      0, since   . Every consumer to the left of la will buy from firm 2 
at price , and those to the right will buy from firm 1 at price . Therefore, firms 1 
and 2 make sales of 
  1  1  1     
        1  1  1       
  1  1  1    1  1  1   
         1  1  1    1  1  1     
Their profits are  
    1  1  1       
    1  1  1  
 1  1  1     
(2) Type (b):  non-traders with only offensive coupons 
These consumers are depicted in Figure III.2. Let’s start with consumers on the
interval [−L, 0]. Firm 1 sends offensive coupons while firm 2 sends defensive coupons 
there. The probability of being a non-trader, receiving firm 1’s (offensive) coupons but  
not firm 2’s (defensive) coupons is 1  1  . Firms’ roles are reversed for 
the interval [0, L]. The density of consumers receiving only offensive coupons there is 
1  1  . 
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Let  and  denote the marginal consumer in segment 1 and 2 respectively. 
The left marginal consumer, located at , is indifferent between buying from firm 1 
with a coupon (thus paying   ) and buying from firm 2 without a coupon (thus 
paying ).26 Similarly, the right marginal consumer (located at ) is indifferent 
between buying from firm 1 at  and buying from firm 2 at   . The exact 
locations of these two marginal consumers are 
      ,          . 
It’s easy to see that   0 and   0. Otherwise, these coupons do not get the 
firms any extra customers, and firms would be better off not to send offensive coupons. 
Consumers located in the interval [−L, ] receive coupons from firm 1, but the face 
value of firm 1’s coupon is not enough to compensate for their strong preferences for 
firm 2’s product. As a result, they will buy from firm 2 at . Since they are non-traders, 
they will not sell firm 1’s coupons. However, for consumers located in (, 0], they 
only have a weak preference for firm 2’s product. With firm 1’s coupons, they will 
choose to buy from firm 1 and pay   . Similarly, consumers located in [0, ) 
will buy from firm 2 at a price of   , and consumers in [, L] will buy from firm 
1 at  the  price . Consequently, firms’ profits are 
    1  1  0    1  1     
               1  1  !    " 
               1  1  !      " 
                                                
26 We assume that firms do not match each other’s coupons. If coupons are matched, then firms 




  1  1        1  1   
         1  1  !      " 
           1  1  !    " 
So far we have considered non-traders who either receive offensive coupons only 
or no coupons. Since we allow firms to distributed both offensive and defensive 
coupons, next we analyze non-traders who receive defensive coupons. In Lemma 1, we 
will show that firms will never distribute both types of coupons. 
(3) Type (c): non-traders with only defensive coupons 
The third type of consumers are non-traders who receive defensive coupons only. 
That is, non-traders on [−L, 0] who receive only firm 2’s coupons and those on [0, L] 
who receive only firm 1’s coupons. Their densities are 1  1   and 
1  1   respectively. 
Let’s start with consumers on the interval [−L, 0]. These consumers prefer firm 
2’s products and we assumed that   . Moreover, they receive coupons from their 
preferred firm but not the other firm. Thus, they will all buy from firm 2 and pay 
  . Next we consider consumers on [0, L]. All these consumers prefer firm 1’s 
product.  Although   , they receive firm 1’s coupon. Let # denote the marginal 
customer who is indifferent between buying from firm 1 with coupon and buying from 
firm 2 without coupon. Then, #      . Depending on the sign of #, there 
are two cases. In the first case, # $ 0, i.e., all consumers on [0, L]  buy from firm 1. 
This case is depicted in Figure III. 3. Firms’ profits are, 
#    1  1  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#    1  1   
In the other case, #>0. Then consumers on [0, #) buy from firm 2 while those 
in [#, L] buy from firm 1. Firms’ profits become 
#    1  1    # 
           1  1         
#    1  1    1  1  # 
           1  1    1  1  !    " 
(4) Type (d) non-traders with both firms’ coupons 
Next, we move on to type (d) consumers—non-traders with both firms’ coupons.  
These consumers are depicted in Figure III.4. Their densities are 1   on [−L, 
0] and 1   on [0, L] respectively. 
Let % and % denote the marginal consumer in segment 1 and 2 respectively. 
The left marginal consumer, located at %, is indifferent between buying from firm 1 
with a coupon (thus  paying    ) and buying from firm 2 also with a coupon (thus 
paying     ). Similarly, the right marginal consumer (located at %) is indifferent 
between buying from firm 1 at a price of     and buying from firm 2 at a price of 
   . The exact locations of these two marginal consumers are 
%          , %           
Consumers located in the interval [−L, %] receive coupons from both firms, and 
the face value of firm 1’s coupon is not enough to compensate for their strong 
preferences for firm 2’s product. As a result, they will use firm 2’s coupons and buy 
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from firm 2 at    . Since they are non-traders, they will not sell firm 1’s coupons.   
However, for consumers located in (%, 0], they only have a weak preference for firm 
2’s product. With firm 1’s coupons, they will choose to buy from firm 1 and pay 
  . Similarly, consumers located in [0, %) will buy from firm 2 at   , and 
consumers in [%, L] will buy from firm 1 at   . Consequently, firms’ profits are 
%     1  0  %     1    % 
             1  ! –      " 
            1  !          " 
%    1  %       1  % 
             1  !     –   " 
            1  !        " 
(5) Type (e): traders 
The last type of consumers is traders, with or without coupon. Their density is α 
on both segments. If coupons are auctioned, they are expected to go to the bidders who 
value them the most, since there is a continuum of traders in our model. So we make the 
assumption that the outcomes of coupon trading are efficient. 
Let’s first consider segment 1 ([−L, 0]), where firm 2’s loyal customers are 
located. These customers may receive firm 1’s offensive coupons and firm 2’s 
defensive coupons. Since    ,  they will buy from firm 2 in the absence of coupons. 
Therefore, they value firm 2’s coupons at their face value, but may value firm 1’s 
coupons at less than the face value. Therefore, they will use firm 2’s coupons, and sell
firm 1’s coupons to traders who are firm 1’s most loyal customers, i.e., those close to 
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L.27 The intended objective of offensive coupons is to poach a rival firm’s loyal 
customers, but since these poached customers generally value coupons less than the 
promoting firm’s loyal customers do, those coupons reaching traders will end up in the 
hands of the promoting firm’s loyal customers. That is, a fraction of the offensive 
coupons (those that reach traders) become somewhat similar to defensive coupons.28 
Next consider segment 2 ([0, L]), where firm 1's loyal customers are located. 
These customers will buy from firm 1 in the absence of coupons, except those located 
close to zero if p₁>p₂. Specifically, anyone located to the right of )     will buy 
from firm 1 in the absence of coupons. They will use firm 1's coupons (if they receive 
these coupons), and sell firm 2's coupons (again if they receive such coupons) to traders 
located near -L—firm 2's most loyal customers. The rest of the consumers [-L, )] will 
buy from firm 2 in the absence of coupons. Therefore, if they receive firm 2's coupons 
they will use such coupons. However, if they receive firm 1's coupons, such coupons 
will be traded to consumers located near L—firm 1's most loyal customers. 
Intuitively, when α is too large, no firm will distribute coupons. We assume 
throughout the paper that   , i.e., there are fewer coupon traders than non-traders.29 
After coupon trading takes place, all coupons reaching traders will be traded to 
consumers who would buy from the coupon-issuing firm with or without the coupons 
                                                
27 We are not concerned with the exact transaction prices of coupons, i.e., how the surpluses will 
be divided between coupon buyers and sellers. In general, traders who receive poaching coupons (from 
their less preferred firm) will choose to sell them back to the promoting firm’s most loyal customers. 
28 These traded offensive coupons are not exactly the same as defensive coupons. First, the face 
value of defensive coupons and traded offensive coupons can be different. Second, offensive coupons 
reaching traders are traded to the distributing firm’s most loyal customers (so the less loyal ones will not 
buy such coupons), while all of the distributing firm’s loyal customers have an equal probability of 
receiving the defensive coupons. 
29 Our results show that when α=1, firms stop sending coupons altogether (λij=0, i, j=1, 2). 
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(thus they value the coupons at their face value—the maximum value). Therefore, after 
the coupon distribution and trading, there is a marginal consumer ) n ar the middle, 
who does not have a coupon and is indifferent between both products at their regular 
prices,30 
)     
To the left of ), all consumers buy from firm 2. Those close to -L will use firm 
2's coupon whether they receive it or buy it. Those to the right of ) all buy from firm 1, 
with consumers close to L using firm 1's coupon. Consumers in the neighborhood of ) 
will not have coupons to use, since there is more demand than supply for coupons. 
Firms' profits from the traders are, 
)    )     
                  
)    )     
                  
Aggregating firms' profits over all types of consumers, and subtracting the cost of 
distributing coupons, we can obtain firm i's overall profit 
  * )+  
  
,   1,2. 
with j being the segment. 
                                                
30 This requires that there is more demand than supply for each firm’s coupons, and the consumers 
in the neighborhood of ) will not have coupons. Intuitively this holds if distributing coupons is 




Firm i’s problem is  
max πi(pi, λij, rij, p−i, λ−i,j, r−i,j), i, j = 1, 2. 
We will divide the solution to this problem into three steps. First, in Lemma 1, we 
show that a firm never has incentive to distribute both offensive and defensive coupons, 
whether on equilibrium or off equilibrium (deviation). Second, in Lemma 2, we prove 
that firms do not distribute defensive coupons in a pure strategy equilibrium, with or 
without offensive coupons. This leaves the only possibility of distributing offensive 
coupons alone (distributing no coupons at all cannot be optimal given the quadratic 
coupon distribution cost). Last, in Proposition 1, we derive the equilibrium where both 
firms distribute offensive coupons only. 
Lemma 1. When coupon distribution is costly (k>0), firms have no incentive to 
distribute both offensive and defensive coupons, whether on equilibrium or off 
equilibrium (deviation). 
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition is as follows. If a firm distributes coupons to both segments, it 
implies that regular price is not optimal in either segment and in particular lowe price 
improves profits (even after accounting for coupon distribution cost and coupon 
trading). Since lower price is better in both segments, the firm is better off lower its 
regular price and get rid of couponing in one segment. This way, it saves on coupon 
distribution cost from that segment, and also improves profits from both segments. 
It is interesting to compare our results with those in Shaffer and Zhang (1995), 
where firms mix the use of offensive and defensive coupons in equilibrium. In Shaffer 
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and Zhang (1995), firms know the exact location of each individual customer. 
Consequently, they can decide whether or not to send targeted coupon to each 
individual consumer. For those consumers whose preferences are too strong to be 
induced to switch (loyals), firms will not send them coupons. For the rest of the 
consumers (brand-switchers), there is no pure strategy and firms play mixed strategies 
with both firms sending targeted coupons at positive probabilities. On the contrary, in 
our paper, firms do not know the exact locations of customers. Instead, they only know 
whether the customers prefer their products or their rival's products if prices are the 
same. As a result, firms can only tailor their coupon decisions toward each segment 
instead of each individual customer. If it sends defensive coupons to consumers who 
prefer its product, then the consumers who have strong preferences (loyals as in Sh ffer 
and Zhang (1995)) and those who have weak preferences (brand-switchers) have an 
equal probability of receiving its coupons. While it may enhance profit if the brand-
switchers receive coupons, couponing leads to pure losses if the coupons reach 
consumers with strong preferences. Therefore, firms do not want to distribute defensiv  
coupons in our model. 
Lemma 1 explains that firms will never send both offensive and defensive 
coupons. And intuitively since it's optimal for firms to be more aggressive when 
competing for the other firm's loyal customers, they will send only offensive coupons, 
instead of sending defensive coupons only. This is confirmed in the next Lemma. 
Lemma 2. There is no pure strategy equilibrium where firms distribute defensive 
coupons only. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
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The intuition is as follows. Suppose that firm 2 distributes only defensive coupons, 
thus charging lower price to its loyal customers in segment 1 ([-L,0]) than in segment 2. 
Now consider firm 1. It faces lower price from its competitor in segment 1, and 
consumers in segment 1 also prefer firm 2's products. Its best response should be t  
charger lower price in segment 1 than in segment 2. That is, it should distribute 
offensive coupons instead of defensive coupons. 
Proposition 1. There exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which firms 
send only offensive coupons, when k is not too small relative to L. This equilibrium is 
characterized by the following: 
(i) The regular prices are 
    ∗  -./0/.
1234.567/ 89 6/:;<
=:                                              (1) 
where 










(ii)  The Promotion depths are  
    ∗   G∗  :<:H,       0                         (2) 
(iii)  The promotion frequencies are 
    ∗  :<I∗=:I∗.J:K<. ,      0                          3 
iv Firms’ equilibrium profits are 
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1  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1  ?∗?  31  ∗D641  
  
Proof. See Appendix. 
A numerical example 
From equations (1), (2), (3) and (4), we can see that ∗ nd ∗ are linear in L, ∗ 
is quadratic in L, and ∗ is independent of L. Thus we normalize L=1. We choose k=1/2 
and further set α=1/5, i.e., 20% of the consumers are traders. Then the equilibrium is 
∗  0.9525, ∗  0.3512, ∗  0.0987, ∗  0.9309. 
Recall that the coupon distribution cost is k(λL)². Plugging the value of k, λ and L, 
this cost is about 0.005, or about 0.5% of the regular price.  
Prisoners' dilemma 
The model without coupons is essentially a standard Hotelling model (with the 
measure of consumers being 2 instead of 1). It can be easily verified that the 
equilibrium price is p=1. Each firm takes half of the market and enjoys a profit of π=1. 
Sending coupons to consumers first reduces firms' regular prices (seeing now that ∗ 
<1). This is because, when a firm's loyal customers are poached by the rival firm, it 
responds by lowering its regular price to try to retain these loyal customers. Lower 
regular prices lead to lower profits. The discounts which some consumers get by using 
coupons and the coupon distribution cost will lower firms' profits even further (∗<∗). 
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III.3.1. Comparative statics 
Proposition 1 provides the expressions of the equilibrium price and promotion 
variables (p,r,λ and π). If we normalize L=1, these variables are only functions of k and 
α. Therefore, we can analyze how they vary when we change either α or k, one at a time. 
The expressions for the relevant partial derivatives are very lengthy for rep rting.31 We 
tried various parameter value of α and k, and found that the qualitative comparative 
statics results do not depend on the choice of parameter value. Below, we assign 
parameter value and report the results in graphs. 
Fix k and vary α 
As long as k is sufficiently large so that firms have no incentive to deviate (details 
in Proof of Proposition 1), our results are robust to the choice of k. Results for 
   are 
reported in Figure III.5. 
From the figure we can see that, when the fraction of coupon traders (α) increases, 
firms promote less frequently (λ↓) and with lower promotion depth (r↓). They set 
higher prices and their profits increase. The intuition is as follows. Optimal promotion 
effort balances the following: 
benefit of couponing = 1– –  
                                    loss of couponing =  
                                    coupon distribution cost = 
  
                                                
31 The Maple file which contains all the expressions is available upon request. 
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A firm reaps benefit when its coupons reaches non-traders, and the benefit is 
given by 1  – . 1   measures the extra consumers the firm can attract, 
at the discounted price of   . However, a loss is realized when the coupons reach 
traders in the form of .  is the proportion of consumers affected, and  is the 
loss of revenue for each of these consumers. There is also a cost of distributing coupons
in the form of 
². An increase in α lowers the benefit and increases the loss. To re-
balance the benefit, loss, and distribution cost (λ affects all three terms), λ needs to go 
down. This is because, the benefit and loss are linear in λ, while the cost of distributing 
coupons is quadratic in λ.
    Now let's see why an increase in α also puts downward pressure on coupon face 
value . When  increases, the benefit decreases and the loss increases. To re-balance 
the benefit and loss ( affects the benefit and loss directly),  needs to decrease. While  
does not enter into the distribution cost term, there is an indirect tradeoff effect between 
promotion frequency and depth. That is, a firm can poach more of a rival's customers by 
either sending more coupons with the same face value or sending the same number of 
coupons but with larger face value. This indirect effect implies that, when a firm
reduces its promotion frequency, it increases its promotion depth. Our result suggests 
that, this indirect tradeoff effect is dominated by the direct effect of downward pressure 
on promotion depth. With fewer poaching coupons of less value there is less 
competition; thus price and profits go up. Obviously, consumers become worse off. 
    In a model with covered market and inelastic demand like ours, welfare 
analysis is not very informative. Nevertheless, we would like to point out an effect 
which coupon trading has on efficiency. Customer poaching leads to inefficient brand 
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switching (consumers buy products they like less). If we fix firms' promotion intensities, 
allowing coupons to be traded implies less brand switching, thus improves efficiency. 
On top of this, coupon trading also reduces firms' promotion intensities, which leads to 
even less brand switching.  
Fix α and vary k 
We tried various value of α∈ [0, 1/2), and the results do not change qualitatively. 
Results when α= 0.2 are plotted in Figure III.6. These results are similar to those in 
Bester and Petrakis. 
From the figure, we can see that when k increases, firms respond by promoting 
less frequently (↓) but with higher promotion depth (↑). Prices (even net of coupon 
face value) and profits go up. These results are quite similar to the resultswhen we fix 
 
and vary , and so is the intuition. Both coupon trading () and distribution cost (
) 
work against sending coupons, and firms have fewer incentives to promote. However, 
the implications on promotion depth are different. When firms promote less frequently 
due to larger cost of distributing coupons, they respond by increasing the promotion 
depth (tradeoff effect). This is because, while an increase in  applies a direct 
downward pressure on , an increase in 
 does not directly affect the benefit and loss of 
promotion, but only indirectly through  and . Thus, when 
 increases, only the 
indirect tradeoff effect (higher promotion depth to go with lower promotion frequency) 
exists. Consequently, promotion depth increases with 
. Since sending coupons 
constitutes a prisoners' dilemma game, less promotion reduces competition intensity, 
which leads to higher prices (including prices net of coupons). There are two opposite 
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effects governing the effects of an increase in 
 on profits. First, the cost of distributing 
coupons increases, affecting profits negatively. Second, when 
 increases, competition 
is less intense which will improve profits. Our results show that the second effect 
dominates the first one. 
III.4. Extensions 
To check the robustness of our results, we extend our model in the following 
directions. 
III.4.1 Introducing coupon non-users 
In our model, we have assumed that all consumers are coupon users. This is 
unrealistic and the sole purpose of this is to simplify the analysis. Nevertheless, here we 
show that our results do not change qualitatively if we introduce consumers who do not 
use coupons. Assume that there is a fraction, 1  a, of consumers who do not use 
coupons. They are also uniformly distributed on the interval [-L, L], but they are 
allowed to have different price sensitivity than the coupon users do. Specifically, we 
assume that a coupon non-user located at l is indifferent between buying from either 
firm if and only if  l = 
I6 I.b . 32 The remaining a fraction of consumers are the same as 
in our model. We then analyze two setups, depending on whether or not the firms can 
distribute mass media coupons, in addition to the poaching coupons. We find that in 
both setups, our comparative statics results stay qualitatively the same as those in the 
main model. 
                                                
32 If we want coupon non-users to be less price sensitive, then we need t≥1. Recall that for 
coupon users the marginal consumer is l = ₁  ₂. 
46 
 
    In the first one, firms cannot distribute mass media coupons. Following 
analysis similar to that in the main model, we look for a symmetric equilibrium 
(₂   ₁, ₂  ₁, ₂  ₁). We can then study how the equilibrium price, promotion 
intensity and profit change with respect to  r 
. The comparative statics results are 
the same as those in Section III.3.1. 
With the introduction of coupon non-users, especially when they are less price 
sensitive than the coupon users are, it is natural to consider not just poaching coupons, 
but mass media coupons as well. In the second setup, we assume that firms can 
distribute mass media coupons to all consumers costlessly. We further assume that ass 
media coupons and poaching coupons can be combined. When firms send mass-media 
coupons, all coupon users enjoy the discount of mass media coupons while coupon non-
users pay regular price. This is equivalent to firms charging one price for coupons users, 
and another price for coupon non-users. Therefore, we can treat coupon users and 
coupon non-users as in separate markets. Then the coupon non-users market is the same 
as the whole market in our initial model (of course with different market sizes) and the 
comparative statics results are qualitatively the same as those in Section III.3.1. 
III.4.2 Non-tradable coupons 
We assumed that coupons are tradable in our model. But why would firms allow 
their coupons to be traded? With online coupons, firms can certainly tie coupon codes 
to the consumers they are targeting, and refuse to honor the coupons if used by others.33
To analyze the issue of non-tradable coupons, we introduce another stage to our three-
                                                
33 For firms to do this, they must be able tie coupons with consumers. That is, they can identify 
each customer (e.g., name, address) without knowing his/her location on the interval [-L, L] (preferences). 
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stage game. In particular, in stage 0, firms first simultaneously and indepe ntly 
decide whether they want their coupons to be tradable. We assume that tradable and 
non-tradable coupons cost the same to distribute. Once decisions of coupon types are 
made, the rest of the game proceeds in the same fashion as in Section III.2. There are a 
total of four subgames after the coupon type decisions are made, depending on whether 
the coupons are tradable or not. In the first subgame (T, T), both firms' coupons are 
tradable. This is the same as our main model. In the second subgame, neither firm's 
coupons are tradable (NT, NT). This is similar to imposing    0 in our main model. 
Subgame 3 (T, NT) and 4 (NT, T) are symmetric to each other, where one firm's 
coupons are tradable but not the other firm's. We find that in general, firms want to 
mimic each other's decisions on coupon types. That is, a firm wants to make its coupons 
tradable if the other firm sends tradable coupons as well.34 Both subgame 1 and 2 can be 
supported in subgame perfect Nash equilibria. However, equilibrium profits are higher
in subgame 1, justifying our use of tradable coupons.35 
III.4.3 Asymmetric Firms  
When firms are symmetric, the equilibrium is symmetric and both firms always 
promote (λd > 0). In this subsection, we allow firms to be asymmetric by introducing a 
measurement of asymmetry, e. Consumers are distributed on the interval [-L+ e, L+e], 
with e  0. Let firm 1’s segment to be L+e, and firm 2’s segment to be -L+ e. We then 
                                                
34 An exception is that when both α and k are small, we have asymmetric equilibria where only 
one firm chooses to issue tradable coupons. 
35 Note that the (NT, NT) subgame is the same as the (T, T) subgame but with α=0. From our 
comparative statics results, we have shown that equilibri m profits increases with α. Thus (T, T) leads to 
higher profits for firms than (NT, NT) does. Making coupons tradable may also have other benefits which 
we do not model here. For example, verifying non-tradable coupons adds hassle costs to both the firm and 




look for asymmetric equilibrium. Specifically we are interested in finding whether one 
or both firms stop promoting can emerge as equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume 
firms only send offensive coupons. There are 4 possible promotion strategy 
combinations as in the table III.1. 
Next we explain how we check for possible equilibrium in each of these four 
types, starting with type 4 where both firms promote. Firms' profits are given as 
followings: 
   f  1    g  1  1h    ei  1    !2      2    e"  
   e   !      1         e"  1    !  2      2  e"  
   e 
The first order conditions are 
∂πd∂λd   ∂πd∂dd   ∂πd∂pd  0, i  1, 2. 
Using 
lmnlon  0 and lmnlpn  0, we can obtain λd and dd (i = 1, 2) as functions of p 
and p.36 We can then plug them into  lmnlqn , which are polynomials of degree 3 in p and 
p, as in the symmetric case. However, lmnlqn are also polynomials of q, specifically lm.lq. is 
a polynomial of degree 5 in q. As a result, we cannot solve p and p analytically and 
we have to rely on numerical analysis instead. Since the results are not sensitive to 
 
qualitatively, we fix k    for this section.37 Pick any α t u0, H , q  0 and normalize 
                                                
36   $ 1 is required and imposed throughout the paper. 




L = 1, we can solve for  and  numerically, and then use them to get  , . 38 If the 
resulting  ,  > 0, we say there is no violation, and we only need to check whether one 
or both firms have incentive to deviate by not promoting. For some parameter 
combinations, the solution to FOC leads to violations, for example,  < 0. In this case, 
we assume that firm 2 will not promote (    0), and solve the new FOCs.39 
Then we check whether firms have incentives to deviate. 
Next we present a series of lemmas which establish part of Proposition 2. 
Lemma 3. When the degree of firm asymmetry e is large, firm 2 will not promote. 
Moreover, when e v L, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
The intuition of why the smaller firm does not promote when e is large is as 
follows. For simplicity, assume that  = 0, i.e., no coupon traders. If the smaller firm 
sends coupon to the large firm's customers, all these customers have an equal 
probability of receiving the coupon. Note that the smaller firm charges a lower pric , so 
the larger firm's less loyal customers will switch to the smaller firm even without the 
smaller firm's coupons. Sending them coupons will not change their purchasing 
decisions, but it will lead to lower final price. So the smaller firm has no incentive to 
send coupons. The larger firm does not have this problem, since without its coupon, the 
smaller firm's loyal customers will never purchase from the larger firm. 
                                                
38 We have multiple solutions of p1, p2, and we pick the only one with ,   t 0, 2. 
39 If there are violations for both firms, we assume that neither firm will promote. 
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When e is very large (e v L), i.e., if two firms charge the same price then almost 
all consumers will buy from one firm, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. This is 
because it is in the higher quality firm's best interest to send out coupons and grab all its 
rival's customers who receive coupons and are not coupon traders. This leads to a corner 
solution. But then firm 2 will always have incentive to either increase or decrease its 
price, and there is no pure strategy equilibrium. To guarantee the existence of a pure 
strategy equilibrium, we make the following assumption: 
Assumption 1: e is not too large ge   ew, 
h. 
The cutoff ew depends on  and 
. For example, set k = , we find ew x 0.82 when 
α = 0 and ew x 0.98 when  = 0.49. 
Lemma 4. The equilibrium is of Type 4 (both firms promote), if and only if e is 
small. 
Proof. Whether a firm promotes or not depends on the cost and benefit of 
promoting. We have showed that when e = 0, both firms promote in the symmetric 
equilibrium. A sufficiently small but positive is not going to change the cost/benefit 
of promotion much. Therefore, when q is small, although the equilibrium is asymmetric, 
both firms will promote. 
When e is not small, our results show that the solutions to FOCs lead to violations 
(either    0 or  < 0), which implies that there is no type 4 equilibrium. 
We have now analyzed the case when q is small (type 4 equilibrium) or large (no 
PSNE). When q takes intermediate values, we will end up with the other three types of 
equilibria. The following proposition summarizes our results. 
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Proposition 2.  Fix k =  
 . The equilibria we find are plotted in Figure III.7. 
Depending on α, there are 4 patterns when q increases: 
(i) α < 0.333: the pattern is Type 4 v Type 1 v No PSNE. 
(ii)  t 0.334, 0.338: the pattern is Type 4 v Type 1 v Type 2 v Type 1 v No 
PSNE. 
(iii)  t 0.339, 0.381:: the pattern is Type 4 v Type 3 v Type 2 v Type 1 v 
No PSNE. 
(iv)  t 0.382, 0.499: the pattern is Type 4 v Type 1 v Type 2 v No PSNE. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Discussion of comparative statics results when α i creases 
Due to the numerical nature of our results, we are not sure how an increase in α 
would affect equilibrium price, promotion frequency and depth and profits, since this 
depends on the values of q and α in general. The general theme in Figure III.7 is that, 
for any e  ew, 
, when α increases, firms are less likely to promote. This result has 
the same spirit as the benchmark symmetry case, that is, more coupon trading makes 
promotion less attractive, and firms respond by reducing their promotion frequency and 
intensity, although at different paces. From the figure, the area for Type 4 equilibrium 
shrinks, i.e., it's less likely to have both firms promote. The area for Type 2 grows. It's 
empty when  is small, but its size increases when α i creases about certain threshold, 
implying that it's more likely to have no firm promoting as an equilibrium. When  
increases, the smaller firm may stop promoting first. This is the case for most e 's, and 
the pattern is Type 4 v Type 1 v Type 2. However, when e is small, the larger firm 
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may stop promoting first, and the pattern is Type 4 v Type 3 v Type 2. Intuitively, 
when firms reduce their promotion frequency and depth, they would increase 
equilibrium prices as well, which will leads to higher profits, just as in the symmetric 
case. However since firms are asymmetric, an increase in α may affect the two firms 
differently, in terms of magnitude or even direction of the effects. 
III.5. Conclusion 
There is a large literature on price discrimination, which has typically maintained 
the assumption that consumer arbitrage is not feasible. This assumption is increasingly 
violated when price discrimination is achieved through couponing, and coupons are 
increasingly traded online. We relax the no-arbitrage assumption by allowing coupons 
to be traded to and used by consumers not initially targeted by the firm. In particular, 
we assume that a fraction of consumers are coupon traders who can buy/sell coupons. 
We then analyze the impact of coupon trading on firms' decisions to promote (in terms 
of promotion frequency and promotion depth), the equilibrium prices and profits. We 
find that when the fraction of coupon traders increases, firms respond by promoting less 
frequently (sending fewer coupons out) and reducing the face value of coupons. This 
reduces competition and leads to higher equilibrium prices and profits. When the cost of 
distributing coupons increases, the results on promotion frequency, prices and profits 
are similar to the results when the fraction of coupon traders increases. This is because 
both coupon trading and distribution costs work against coupon promotions, reducing a 
firm's incentives to promote. The only difference is that while coupon face value 
decreases with the fraction of coupon traders, it increases with coupon distribution cos . 
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In both cases, consumers are all worse off since prices increase. Our results are robust 
to several extensions including the introduction of coupon non-users, non-tradable 
coupons and asymmetric firms. 
III.6. Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Without loss of generality due to symmetry, we only show that firm 1 has no 
incentive to distribute both offensive and defensive coupons. Suppose not, fix firm 2's 
price and promotion strategies, and let ₁, ₁₁, ₁₂, ₁₁ and ₁₂ denote firm 1's best 
response to firm 2's strategy. We call this the initial strategy. Since firm 1 distributes 
both offensive and defensive coupons, thus   0 and    0, j =1, 2.     
Next we will rank r₁₁ and r₁₂. Intuitively firms are more aggressive and charge 
lower prices in the other firm's turf, due to best-response asymmetry (One firm's weak 
market is the other firm's strong market). This implies r₁₁ > r₁₂. We will show that firm 
1 can improve its profit by playing the following strategy instead 
y      , y   , y      , y    y  0. 
We call this strategy the alternative strategy, where firm 1 distributes offensive 
coupons only. Next, we prove that compared to the initial strategy, under the alternative 
strategy, firm 1 (i) earns weakly higher profit from the non-traders; (ii) earns weakly 
higher profit from the traders and (iii) saves on coupon distribution cost.  
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Higher profit from non-traders 
We first calculate firm 1's profit from non-traders under the initial strategy. Start 
with consumers on the left interval [-L, 0]. Let < denote firm 1's expected profit in 
the left segment when its effective price is p. Firm 1's profit in the left segment is 
1   <z   <z  . 
Similarly firm 1's profit in the right segment is 
1   {z   {z  . 
Note that <z    <z    and  {z    {z     must hold. 
Otherwise, firm 1 would be better off not to distribute the coupons. Moreover, since the 
initial strategy is a best-response to firm 2's strategy, p₁ - r₁₁ maximizes firm 1's profits. 
This implies that 
<z       <z       <z, 
    since p₁ - r₁₁ < p₁ - r₁₂ < p₁, and < is concave in p (demand is linear in p), 
and p₁ - r₁₁ is a maximum.  
Firm 1's profit from non-traders under the initial strategy (with both types of 
coupons) is 
   1   <z  <z      1   {z
  {z    
Similarly, we can show that firm 1's profit from non-traders under the altern tive 
strategy (with offensive coupons only) is 
y   1  <z      <z      {z  . 
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We have shown that <z       <z and {z       {z.  
Thus 
y    ,  
and firm 1 earns higher profit from the non-traders under the alternative strategy. Th  
inequality is strict unless λ₁₁ = λ₁₂ = 0.  
Higher profit from traders 
Next we compare firm 1's profit from traders under the initial strategy and th t 
under the alternative strategy. In both segments, firm 1's final prices after coupons are 
the same under either strategy, while the regular price is lower under the alternative 
strategy. For traders who receive firm 1's coupons, lower regular price means that they 
are more likely to buy from firm 1, instead of buying from firm 2 and selling firm 1's 
coupons. This improves profits. Moreover, when coupons are traded, lower coupon face 
value also implies lower loss for firm 1. Therefore, firm 1's profit from trade s is higher 
under the alternative strategy.  
Save on coupon distribution cost 
The coupon distribution cost is 
₁₁²   
₁₁² under the initial strategy, 
while it's only 
₁₁² under the alternative strategy. Whenever 
>0, coupon 
distribution cost is strictly lower under the alternative strategy. 
To summarize, firm 1 earns higher profits from traders and non-traders and saves 
on coupon distribution cost under the alternative strategy. Thus the initial strategy, 
where firm 1 distributes both offensive and defensive coupons, cannot be a best-
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response to firm 2's strategy. Therefore, it will never distribute both typesof coupons on 
equilibrium or off equilibrium (in deviation).  
Proof of Lemma 2. 
We start by deriving firm 1's best response in each segment, assuming that, 
hypothetically, it can choose an individual price for each segment. We use L to denote
the left segment or segment 1, and use R to denote the right segment (segment 2). We 
use  and  , I = 1, 2, j = L, R to denote firm i's price at and profit from segment j. 
Then 
<   z<!0   z<   z<",     {   z{!   z{   z{". 
The first-order conditions are 
|<|<   2<  <  0 }   <   12 < . 
|{|{     2{  {  0 }   {   12   12 { . 
For firm 1 to have incentive to send defensive coupons only, it must be that 
{    <  ~  <   {    .  
    However, this is impossible when firm 2 is sending defensive coupons only. 
For consumers who do not receive its coupons, the effective prices are the same, or 
<   { . For those who do receive firm 2's defensive coupons (in the left segment), 
we have <   {. 
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    Therefore, whenever firm 2 sends defensive coupons only, firm 1's best 
response is to choose <    { , i.e., to send offensive coupons instead of defensive 
coupons. 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
We divide this proof into three parts. In part 1, we assume that firms do not 
distribute defensive coupons, and we derive the optimal prices and offensive couponing 
strategies. This is the equilibrium candidate. Then in part 2, we show that neither firm 
has incentive to deviate from this without distributing defensive coupons.40 I  part 3, we 
show that neither firm has incentive to deviate and distribute defensive coupons only. 
Recall that Lemma proved that neither firm has incentive to distribute both offensive 
and defensive coupons, on or off equilibrium.  
Part 1: Equilibrium candidate: Firms distribute offensive coupons only   
When firms distribute offensive coupons only, ₁₂  ₂₁  ₁₂  ₂₁  0, and 
type (c) and (d) customers do not exist. Firms' profit functions become 
   z1   1     z   z   z1      z   z    
 z   1   z   z     z  z   z     
                                                                                                             (5) 
   z1   1     z1   1   z   z  z1    
 z1 11 2 z2 221 22z1 z2 22 z2 z1 z2 
                                                                                                   (6) 
                                                




We can use the FOCs for both firms, or use FOC for either firm and then impose 
symmetry conditions. Both lead to the same solutions. We will report the latter mehod 
here. 
         Taking derivative of π₁ with respect to p₁, r₁₁ and λ₁₁ respectively, then imposing 
the symmetry conditions (p₂ = p₁, r₂₂ = r₁₁ and λ₂₂=λ₁₁), we can obtain 
666         2  2    0.                                     (7) 
666   2
             0     0.              (8) 
6I6                 0.                            (9) 
Since the cost of coupon distribution is quadratic in λ, and the rest is roughly 
linear in λ, it must be that the optimal λ₁₁>0. Then, equation (7) implies, 
   :< I6= :I6:    G   :< :H.                                           (10) 
    From this expression, we can see that p₁ > r₁₁. 
    Next, we substitute the expression of r₁₁ into equation (8) and solve for λ₁₁. We 
obtain 
   :< I6= :I6.J:K<. .                                                              (11) 
Using r₁₁ and λ₁₁ in equation (9), we can solve for the equilibrium price,41 
                                                
41 There are 3 solutions. We pick the one that is real and positive. 
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   
 23 >   32 
49    163 
>  13    
1     . 
Where 










We can substitute this expression of p₁ back into the expressions of r₁₁ and λ₁₁. 
The final expressions are too lengthy to report. 
So far, we have used first order conditions to solve for the optimal choices of 
prices and promotion intensities. However, first order conditions are necessary but not 
sufficient. We need to make sure that the solutions we obtained indeed constitute an 
equilibrium. Instead of checking whether the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite 
(which is quite messy), we show that this is an equilibrium by verifying that neither 
firm has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from this pair of strategies (B ter and 
Petrakis use a similar method). Without loss of generality, we fix firm 2's price and 
promotion strategies as given in Proposition 1, and allow firm 1 to deviate from these 
strategies.   
Part 2: Firm 1 deviates without sending defensive coupons 
Since neither firm sends defensive coupons, there is still no type (c) and (d) 
customers in deviation. Note that the demand/profit functions depend on the locations 
of marginal consumers and there are two cases. In the first case, p₁ ≥ p₂ still holds and 
60 
 
thus   0. In the second case, p₁ < p₂. In both cases, we assume that   0 and 
  0. 42 
Start with case 1 where p₁ ≥ p₂ still holds. Firm 1's deviation profit is given by 
equation (5), with    ∗,    ∗   and    ∗. We normalize L=1. Optimal 
choice requires that 
|%)|   |
%)|  0 
Solving the first order conditions, we obtain 
%)  21    1  ∗  21   , 
%)    ∗  4  2∗  2∗  4  2∗  ∗1  
 . 
The first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. We leave the ∗ erm in 
the expression, as clearly the expressions will be too lengthy to report if we substitute 
the value of ∗. Now firm 1's deviation profit depends only on %), α and k. We want 
to check whether firm 1 can increase its profit by choosing %)  ∗, i.e., to have 
%)g%)h  ∗,  , 
. 
We tried various combinations of α and k, and we found that firm 1 can never 
increase its profit by choosing a price different than ∗. Therefore, firm 1 has no 
incentive to deviate when no defensive coupons are used in the deviation. We then 
                                                
42 If  $ 0, then our formula of  would be exaggerated. This is because the relevant demand 
is capped at L while our formula leads to   . Since we show that firm 1 has no incentive to deviat  
under the exaggerated demand function, it surely has no incentive to deviate under the correct demand 
function. Thus we ignore the case of    0. Note that   0 must hold. This is because, as the 
deviating firm, firm 1 must be able to sell to some of firm 2's loyal customers, i.e.,   0. 
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proceed to the case of   0 (i.e. p₁<p₂). The steps are similar and we find that firm 1 
has no incentive to deviate if k is not too small relative to L.43 
Next we want to show that firm 1 has no incentive to deviate and send defensive 
coupons only. 
Part 3: Firm 1 deviates by sending defensive coupons only   
In proof of Lemma 2, we have shown that firm 1's best response is to choose 
<  { as long as <  {  . In the proposed equilibrium candidate, when 
consumers (in the right segment or segment 2) receive firm 2's offensive coupons, we 
have 
<  ∗, {  ∗  ∗  <  {  ∗ $ . 
When consumers in segment 2 do not receive firm 2's coupons, firm 2's prices are 
the same in the two segments 
<  {  ∗. 
In both cases, we have 
<  { $   <  {. 
Therefore, firm 1 should not send defensive coupons only. 
                                                
43 Details are available in the companion Maple file.For L=1 and α=0, the threshold value for k is 
around k=0.159. Technically, there is another constraint on k. That is, when k is sufficiently small, our ∗ formula leads to ∗>1, which should be replaced by ∗=1 (Probability cannot be greater than 1). 
However, we find that this constraint on k is never binding since the threshold k is smaller than the 
threshold k for firms not to have incentive to lower prices and deviate. For example, when α=0, while the 
threshold k for no deviation is k=0.159 (i.e., no deviation if k>0.159), that for for ∗=1 is k=0.033. 
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Proof of Lemma 3 
First we show that when e is large, firm 2 does not promote. Let’s look at non-
traders with coupons when firm 2 promotes. Firm 2 will make sale at [0,      ]. 
If firm 2 does not promote, it can only sell in the interval [0,   ]. The gain in 
marginal revenue is       , i.e., a gain of  extra customers at price 
     . The loss in inframarginal revenue is   , because a measure 
of   , customers now enjoy discount and  pay    instead of . The 
results show that,        increases with q and becomes positive 
when q is large. Thus when q is large, gain is less than loss, and firm 2 will never 
promote. If we include the coupon distribution cost and the possibility of coupon 
trading, then firm 2 will have even less incentive to promote.  
Next we show that when q is sufficiently close to L, there is no pure strategy 
equilibrium. We do this in two steps. In step 1, we show that fixing , firm 1 has 
incentive  to promote,  and grab all firm 2’s loyal customers  who receive coupons. In 
step 2, we show that given ,  as best  reply of , firm 2 will always have incentive  
to change . 
Step 1: We know that firm 2 will not promote. Suppose that firm 1 does not 
promote as well. Then         0. The solution to FOCs is 
  1  e3 ,   1  e3 
Now consider the following deviation, firm 1 promotes and set . When 
 v 0, the marginal cost of coupon distribution is 0, since this cost is quadratic in λ1. 
Therefore, if we assume  v 0, coupon distribution cost can be ignored. 
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The gain is new sales to firm 2’s loyal customers who are non-traders but with 
firm 1’s coupons, 
  1       
The loss happens when some coupons reach traders and are traded back to firm 
1’s loyal customers, 
    e 
Let ∆ = gain−loss. It can be showed that when q is sufficiently large, firm 1 has
incentive to set d1 such that       1  e, i.e.,       1  e 
1  e. In this case, for all firm 2’s loyal customers who receive firm 1’s coupons, they 
will buy from firm 1. Then, 
∆ 3 1  e2e  e  3 
Obviously ∆ 0 when e  ?::, with ?::  1 since   . 
If we allow  to be different from 1  e, following similar steps as above, we 
can obtain  
∆ 3 1  e2e  e  3  3  3 
It can be easily checked that ∆ 0 when e  ?=:I.?: . We need ?=:I.?:  1, 
which is satisfied if   D:? . 44  
                                                
44 If  is small, firm 1 will not try to take all firm 2’s loyal customers who receive coupons. But 
in this case, firm 2 is always better off raising . In all the equilibria we find,  > 1/2 is always satisfied. 




Therefore, when >4α, firm 1 will always promote, and choose  such that last 
consumer (located at −1+q) is exactly indifferent between buying from firm 1 with 
coupon, and buying from firm 2 without coupon. 
Step 2: Pick >4α. Now we explain that firm 2 does not  promote, firm 1 
promotes and set       1  e can’t be an equilibrium. Let    
,b), where  denotes firm 2’s profit from its loyal customers who receive firm 
1’s coupons, and ,b) denotes its profit from all other customers. Note that ,b) 
is continuously differentiable in . If firm 2 increases  slightly,  will still be zero. 
Assume that firm 2 has no incentive to increase , then, 
||= $ 0 } |,b)| $ 0 
If firm 2 decreases  slightly, it will gain some of its own loyal customer who 
receive firm 1’s coupons. This is because previously the last consumer is exactly
indifferent between buying from firm 1 with coupon, and buying from firm 2 at . 
Therefore, 
||  0 
Then 
||  ||  |,b)|  0 
This implies that firm 2 will always have incentive to lower , if we assume that 
it  has no incentive to increase . 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
Since these are numerical results, we present details for specific parameter 
combinations of  and e, for type 1, 2 and 3 equilibria, and explain why they are 
equilibria. Type 4 equilibrium is explained in Lemma 4. 
Type 1: Larger firm promotes, smaller firm does not. 
This is an equilibrium with various (, e) combinations (including   0). Set 
  0.2, e  0.5 for example. Assume that both firms promote, the solution for FOCs 
lead to  < 0. So we assume that firm 2 does not promote, but firm 1 does. The 
equilibrium is =1.112, =0.741, =0.155, =0, =0.679, =0, and  =1.258, 
=0.617. In this case, q is not small, so that firm 2 will not promote, as explained after 
Lemma 3. But q is not too large either, so firm 1 will make sales to part but not all of 
firm 2’s loyal customers who receive firm 1’s coupons. If firm 1 deviates nd stop 
promoting, we show that its profit will go down. If firm 2 deviates, we find that the 
unique interior solution has =< 0, so firm 2 will not deviate either. So neither firm 
has incentive to deviate. 
Type 3: Smaller firm promotes but not the larger firm. 
This happens when α is large and q is intermediate. Set   0.4, e  0.15. 
Assume both firms promote, the solution to FOCs leads to < 0. So we assume that 
firm 1 does not promote, firm 2 promotes, and we look for a type 3 equilibrium. The 
equilibrium is =1.05, =0.95, ==0, =0.0007, = 0.041 =1.102, 
=0.902. In this case, if firm 1 deviates and starts promoting, we find that < 0, 
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which is a violation. If firm 2 deviates and set ==0, its profit will go down. So 
neither firm has incentive to deviate. 
The key difference between this case and the corresponding case with similar q 
but without coupon trading is that, the larger firm has no incentive to promote. The 
intuition is as follows. The larger firm sets a higher regular price than the smaller firm 
does (  ), and with sufficient firm asymmetry, this difference    can be quite 
large.  For firm 1 to make a sale to its rival’s loyal customers, it has to send coupons 
with significant face values (    ). Firm 1’s gain is   when the coupon 
reaches a switching non-trader (0 when they  don’t switch), and the loss is    
when the  coupon reaches a coupon trader. When d1 is small (but still greater than 
  ), firm 1 cannot attract many firm 2’s loyal customers. But if  is large, the 
loss of coupons reaching traders is large too. As a result, there is no  that can attract 
enough of firm 2’s loyal customers to compensate for the cost of coupon trading. 
However, firm 2 does not have this problem. It can set any > 0, arbitrarily small if 
necessary, to attract more of firm 1’s loyal customers. So it will promote when q is not 
too large. 
Type 2: Neither firm promotes. 
This happens only when α and q are large. Set   0.4, e  0.5 for example. 
Assume both firms promote, the solution to FOCs lead to violations for both firms 
(< 0, < 0). So we assume that neither firm will promote, and look for a type 2 
equilibrium. The equilibrium we find is =1.166, =0.833, ==== 0, 
=1.361, =0.694. If firm 1 deviates and starts promoting, we find that < 0 which 
is a violation. If firm 2 deviates, we find that < 0, also a violation. So neither firm has 
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incentive to deviate.  The intuition why firm 1 does not promote is similar to above. 
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POST-SALE LOW PRICE GUARANTEE AND PRICE 
FLUCTUATION 
IV.1. Introduction 
As widely observed, the online prices not only differ from store to store, but also 
from time to time45. Recent research on online price dispersion focuses on the price 
dispersion among stores. Very few studies46 look at price fluctuation over time. A 
popular explanation for price changes over time is intertemporal pricing strategy. Firms 
use an intertemporal pricing strategy to either increase demand or to price discriminate 
part of the market. The intertemporal pricing strategy can explain manyrket 
situations very well. However, it does not fit our observation of price patterns from Best 
Buy and Circuit City well for two reasons. First, the intertemporal pricing strategy 
usually predicts prices decrease monotonically over time47, but observed price changes 
often indicate a cyclical movement. Second, a common assumption in the intertemporal 
pricing literature is that some consumers are willing to wait and buy the product in the 
future at a lower price. However, as commonly observed, many retailers today adopt a 
post-sale low price guarantee policy, which allows consumers to get refund if the price 
                                                
45 This difference over time is not monotonically decreasing; rather the price goes up and down 
over time. 
46 There are many literatures look at price change driven by intertemporal pricing strategy. But in 
most of them the price is monotonically decreased over time, which is a typical feature of intertemporal 
pricing theory. 
47 Usually firm lowers its price gradually to extract maximum profits from groups of consumers 
with different demand elasticity or reservation prices. 
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is lowered within limited time period after purchase. Taking this into considerat on, 
only few consumers will want to wait and buy in the future.48  
A simple general description of the low price guarantee policy is the following: if 
you find a lower price than the store’s price, they will refund you the difference or more 
than the difference. If the store only refunds the price difference, it is usually called 
price matching; and if the store refunds more than the difference49, it is called price 
beating. According to the target of LPG, this policy can be divided into two groups: 
LPG targeting at the store’s competitors price, called competitors low price guarantee 
(hereafter CLPG); and LPG targeting at the store’s own post-sale price, called self low 
price guarantee (hereafter SLPG). These two LPG policies are widely used by various 
stores. Some stores only use CLPG, and examples could be found in airline companies, 
Buy.com etc.; some stores only use SLPG, like Amazon.com, Dell etc.; while some use 
both, for example Best Buy and Staples.  
In this paper we explain the cyclical price change over time by firms using SLPG 
to price discriminate across consumers. Specifically we start with a two-period duopoly 
market, in which we show both firms will adopt the low price guarantee policy. At each 
period there are new customers entering into the market. Some with inelastic demand 
have prohibitively high cost of requesting price match; the others with elastic deman  
have low cost of requesting price match, and this cost is normalized to zero. We then 
extend the two-period model to a dynamic model. We find the optimal strategy for 
                                                
48 Those consumers may have very high hassle cost of requesting price match. 
49 Usually 110% of the difference as Best Buy, or 115% of the difference as Skinstore.com. 
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firms is to use a cyclical price strategy to price discriminate the inelastic demand 
consumers.  
Using online price data from Best Buy and Circuit City, we test our theoretical 
prediction. We find a significant negative relationship between the firm’s price change 
and its own previous price change. This means if one firm increases (decreases) its price 
at this period, it will very likely decrease (increase) its price in the following period.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
related literature. Section 3 proposes a general theoretical model to explain cyclical 
price change, then, a specific model to examine the consumer surplus and social surplus, 
and at the end we extend the two-period model to a dynamic model. Section 4 offers 
empirical analysis of Best Buy and Circuit City’s price change. Section 5 concludes.  
IV.2. Theoretical model 
IV.2.1 Overview 
In this section we discuss the details of the SLPG with intertemporal pricing 
model and related notion of equilibrium. Existing intertemporal price discrimination 
literature usually predicts a monotonic price decrease. However, in practice, most of the 
time, we observe that price changes are not monotonic; rather prices fluctuate. With 
firms adopting SLPG policy, we can explain this cyclical price fluctuation over tim . 
We first present a two-period general theoretical model of how duopolies selling 
homogeneous product to a population of heterogeneous consumers should adopt SLPG 
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policy and set their optimal sequence of prices over time.50 Similar to other 
intertemporal pricing models, this model takes demand parameters as given. Consumers 
have complete information of firm pricing policies.51 We then present a more specific 
theoretical model and discuss the firm’s profits, consumer surplus and social surplus
with or without SLPG and intertemporal pricing policy. At the end, we extend he two-
period model to a dynamic model. 
The equilibrium concepts we using here is Nash equilibrium and Sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
IV.2.2 General theoretical model 
We consider a two-period duopoly game, with two firms—1 and 2—produce 
homogeneous goods with constant marginal costs. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize the marginal cost to zero and assume there is no fixed cost or discount factr 
over time. Firms decide their prices simultaneously in each period. In each time period, 
new customers enter the market, and only new customers make purchases in that period. 
This assumption excludes the possibility that consumers can wait and buy at a lower 
price. In each period, consumers enter the market and choose whether to buy the 
product or not. If they choose not to buy, they leave the market and will not re-enter the 
market in the future.52 So each consumer lives in the market in two periods and can only 
make purchase in the first period. 
                                                
50 Since there is no consumer waits and buys in the second period, discount factor doesn’t matter 
in our model. We therefore assume there is no discount factor over time. 
51 These are general assumption made in intertemporal ricing literature. For example, Stokey 
(1979). 
52 Later, with SLPG, we can relax this assumption. And o e can easily show that under SLPG no 
consumer wants to wait and buy since they can request a price match. 
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There are three types of consumers, namely high, medium and low consumers.53 
Each consumer will buy at most one unit of the product from either firm. The high type 
and medium type consumers are willing to pay up to V for the product. We assume that 
the reservation price V is sufficiently high and thus the high type and medium type 
consumers will buy exactly one unit of the product. The high type consumers are 
divided into two groups; each firm embraces a group of high type consumers as their 
loyal consumers. Within each group the high type consumers are willing to paya 
homogeneous premium to buy at their favorite firm. This premium is high enough that 
no high type consumer will buy at the firm other than her favorite firm. Therefore for 
each firm, their own high type consumer’s demand is perfectly inelastic under the 
reservation price. The medium type consumers are heterogeneous with respect to th  
premium they are willing to pay for their favorite brand. We use a parameter l to 
measure this heterogeneity, which can be interpreted as the consumer’s degree of 
loyalty. Specifically, a consumer located at l is indifferent between buying from the two 
firms if and only if l  p  p. We can introduce the asymmetry in this market by 
allowing firm 1(or firm 2) to have a larger medium market share when prices of the two 
firms are equal. The last type is low type consumers, who are heterogeneous in the 
reservation price. This reservation price is not high enough to guarantee each low type 
consumer will buy exactly one unit of the product from either firm. Therefore, r both 
                                                
53 The model with only two types of consumers—high type and low type, or medium type and low 
type—will not change our result qualitatively. The reason we choose three types of consumers is because 
we think this is closer to the real world situation. The high type consumers represent the consumers who 
value the product high enough and are willing to pay a very high premium to shop under a familiar 
environment; the medium type consumers represent th consumers who value the product high enough 
but the premium they are willing to pay is not as high as the high type and heterogeneous; the low type 
consumers are those value the product not high enough. The other reason I adopt three types of 
consumers is that the two types of consumers model will generate a uniform price in the high price period 
(which is not consistent with what we observed in the data) as we will see later when we go to the 
solution of the model. 
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firms, the low type consumers’ demand is elastic. The low type consumers are 
indifferent from buying from either firm, and thus lq6,q.lq6   lq6,q.lq.  54, where D 
is low type’s demand, and p, p are firm 1 and firm 2’s prices respectively. The 
introduction of low type consumers allows our model to be able to fit in a more general 
market rather than a strict duopoly market. For example, we can interpret our model as 
a market with two leading firms and a number of other small firms. The two leading 
firms have some brand advantages over the small firms, and each has certain amount of 
loyal customer who will only buy from their preferred firm. This is the high type 
consumers in my model. There are some consumers who are willing to buy from one of 
the leading firms, but when the price difference is large, they will switch to the ther 
leading firm. This is the medium type consumers in my model. There are also some 
consumers who are willing to buy from the leading firms, but will also switch to the 
small firms if the small firms charge much lower prices. This is the low type consumers 
in my model. 
The two firms compete in prices, and at each stage, they cannot price discriminate 
among customers because they are incapable of charging different prices to different 
customers. The firms have an option to choose whether adopting a SLPG policy or not 
in the first period. If they adopt SLPG, when prices are lowered in the second perio , 
the consumers who bought the product in the first period at a higher price can request a 
price match, and the firm will refund the difference, which is equivalent to knowing 
some consumers buy the product in period 1 at period 2’s price. For example, if firm 1 
adopts SLPG, and it lowers its price from p, to p, from period 1 to period 2, then the 
                                                
54 Introducing firms preference in low type will not change our result qualitatively. 
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consumers who request price match will get a refund of p,  p,; after price matching, 
these consumers actually pay p, for the product. This SLPG policy only applies to the 
firm’s own price one period after sale (i.e. firm 1 will not price match firm 2’s price). 
For simplicity, we assume there is no discount factor over time.  
Following Stokey (1979)55, we assume that consumers know the entire price 
schedules over time of both firms and firms know all relevant characteristics of he 
potential market. Although all period 1 consumers know period 2 prices pd,(i=1,2) in 
period 1, not all of them will request a price match in period 2 even if firms adoptSLPG. 
We assume the high type and medium type consumers have very high hassle cost of 
requesting price matching, and without loss of generality, we assume this hassle cost is 
prohibitively high so that no high type or medium type consumers will request price 
matching. For low type consumers, we assume their hassle cost of requesting a price 
match is very low and normalized to zero. Therefore, if a firm adopts SLPG and its 
price is lowered in period 2, only the low type consumers who make purchases in period 
1 will request a price match. The firms know the fraction and distribution of each type 
of consumers and their reservation prices. We assume the fraction and reservation p ice 
of high type consumer are not too large, and thus both firms want to serve all three 
types of customers when they maximize their profits. 
Next, we discuss some conditions under which there exists pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. When firms do not adopt SLPG, there is no linkage between periods. Each 
firm’s objective is to maximize its profit at each period regardless of its previous or 
following periods’ strategies. Therefore we can analyze this as a static model.  
                                                
55 It’s a monopoly market in her paper, my model here is duopoly market.  
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Condition 1:  
l.mnlqn.  0, for i  1, 2, representing firm 1 or firm 2’s profit 
respectively.56 
 If condition 1 is satisfied, there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
(p∗ , p∗  in the static game when SLPG is not adopted by firms. Each firm will charge its 
optimal single price over time, and there is no price discrimination over time or among 
consumers.   
Since the low type consumers can request price matching one period after sale, 
when firms adopt SLPG, there is a linkage between the two periods. By adopting the 
SLPG policy and intertemporal pricing policy, firms are capable of price disriminating 
the high and medium type consumers in the first period. They can set a high price in the 
first period and then a low price in the second period. The high and medium type 
consumers in the first period will pay the high price; while the low type consumer in 
the first period and all consumers in the second period will pay the low price. Let’s 
denote πd,, as firm i’s profit from type j customers in period t, where i=1,2, and j=h,m,l. 
Dd,, are firms’ corresponding demand defined in similar way.  
Condition2: 
l.mn,6lqn,6.  0, l.mn,.lqn,..  0, where πd,  πd,,  πd,,; πd,  πd,, 
πd,,  πd,,  πd,,, for i  1, 2.  
If condition 2 is satisfied, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the two-
period game when SLPG is adopted. With firm i choosing pd,∗  in period 1, and pd,∗  in 
the period 2, consumers in these two periods can be divided into two groups according 
                                                
56 Png & Hirshleifer (1987) and Corts (1996) made similar assumption to assure strategic 
complementarities of prices and guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium in the game. 
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to the price they paid. Group 1 consists of high and medium type consumers in period 1 
who pay pd,∗  to firm i; group 2 consists of high type, medium type consumers in period 
2 and all low type consumers, who pay pd,∗ to firm i. With this price scheme, each 
group’s profit is maximized, therefore the total profit is also maximized, and no firm 
wants to deviate. By doing this, firms can get maximum profits from high type and 
medium type consumers in the first period, and get maximum profits from the res of
consumers in the second periods.  
Condition 3: ln,lqn   llqn ; Dd,  Dd,  Dd, for any V  d  0. Where Dd, is 
firm i’s demand from high type consumers, Dd, is defined in the similar way for 
medium type and D  is demand for low type consumers. pd is firm i’s price. 
Condition 3 means the low type consumers are more price sensitive than medium 
type and the total demand from high type and medium type consumers is always greater 
than that of low type consumers. With condition 3, firms can get higher profits by 
adopting SLPG and intertemporal pricing policy compared to single price. 
Proposition 1:  When all three conditions are satisfied and firms can choose 
SLPG and an intertemporal pricing strategy, it’s optimal for firms to adopt SLPG and 
charge a high price in the first period and a low price in the following period. The 
single pricing strategy is not a Nash equilibrium. The optimal single price (when firms 
can not choose SLPG or intertemporal pricing strategy) is between the two 
intertemporal prices (When firms can choose SLPG and an intertemporal pricing 
strategy). 
Proof. See Appendix.  
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As proposition 1 shows, when possible, firms will adopt SLPG and intertemporal 
pricing strategy.  Based on the structure of our model, social surplus solely depends on 
the number of consumers served in the market. Under an intertemporal pricing strate y, 
social surplus increases because more low type consumers are served due to the lower 
price in second period compared to the game with a single price restriction. Firm’s 
profit from group 1 consumers will be increased, but profit from group 2 consumers 
may or may not increase; therefore the total profit change is ambiguous. Consumer 
surplus change is ambiguous. There are two opposite effects on consumer surplus. The 
positive effect is that the lower price in the second period increases the consumer 
surplus of high and medium type consumers in the second period and the surplus of all 
low type consumers. The negative effect is the increased price for high and medium 
type consumers in the first period. Following, we propose a specific model, in which we 
can examine profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus.   
IV.2.3 Specific model 
Following our general model setup, at each stage, both firms decide their prices 
simultaneously and they have complete information about consumers’ type and their 
corresponding fractions. There is a total of 2L new consumers entering the mark t each 
period, and the consumers can only make purchases in that period.  Firm 1 and firm 2 
each has βL of high type consumers. There is a total of 2 L medium type consumers. 
The premium they are willing to pay for their favorite store is measured by l, which is 
uniformly distributed on [-L+qt, L+qt].  And the interval [-L+qt, L+qt] is partitioned into 
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two segments: [-L+qt, 0] and [0, L+qt].
57 When two firms charge the same prices, 
consumers locate at [0, L+qt] will buy from firm 1, and we call them firm 1’s medium 
type loyal customers; consumers locate at [-L+qt, 0] will buy from firm 2, and we call 
them firm 2’s medium type loyal customers. The q here is the measurement for degree 
of asymmetry. When qt=0, these two firms are symmetric in the medium type consumer 
market; when qt>0, firm 1 is the strong firm with more market share; when qt<0, firm 2 
is the strong firm. If this asymmetry is constant over time, then qt is constant over time, 
otherwise it varies with time. For simplicity, we assume qt is constant within the two 
periods when we analyze the model. High type and medium type consumers’ 
reservation price is high enough to guarantee one unit demand from each of them. Firm 
i’s demand from low type consumers is 1  β   L  a  αpd  αp.58 α  1 means 
the low type consumers are more demand elastic than medium type. a m asures the 
demand shock, which has a mean zero; and we assume it is constant within each two 
period we study. The low type consumers have complete information about both firms’ 
current and next period prices59.   
Condition 1 and condition 2 in general model are satisfied for any parameter 
values. Condition 3 is satisfied if following inequality is true. 
2¡  ¢  1  23   13 ¢e 
                                                
57 Nowadays many firms have some kinds of reward programs to let consumers sign up. Through 
these programs, firms can get some information about c nsumers’ purchasing history and may extract 
some information about their types and preferences.  
58 We can allow firm demand to have different sensitivity to its own price and its competitor price, 
e.g. introducing £¤   #¥¥ for its own price and competitor price respectively. This adds another 
parameter without changing the qualitative results. For simplicity, we assume that the two sensitivities are 
the same.   
59 Since we assume qt and at are constant within these two periods, the asymmetry and demand 
shock uncertainty will not affect consumers’ complete information about next period prices. 
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Therefore if the fraction of high type and medium type consumers is large enough, 
and the degree of asymmetry is not too large, condition 3 is satisfied.60 
First we look at firms’ optimal strategy when they do not adopt SLPG. Under this 
setup, since there is no connection between each two periods, firms will choose an 
optimal price to maximize their profits in each period. Firm 1’s profit is as follow: 
π  π,  π,  π, 
π,  p ∗ βL 
π,  p L  q  p  p 
π,  pg1  β   L  a  αp  αph 
We can get firm 2’s profit in similar way. We then take first order conditions, set 
it equal to zero and solve for optimal prices. There is only one set of solution, and the 
second order condition is negative, therefore this game has a unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium with firms’ prices as follow: 
p  13  q  3L  3a   α , p  13  q  3L  3a   α  
Without assigning parameters values, firms’ profits are too lengthy to display.  
Next, we study firms’ optimal strategies when SLPG is adopted. We denote firm 
i’s profit from type j consumers in period t as πd,,, firm i’s price in period t as pd,. Then 
we can write firm 1 and firm 2’s profits as follow: 
π  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,, 
π  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,, 
                                                
60 When the two firms are symmetric, condition 3 is satisfied if ¡  ¢  0.5. 
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π,,  p,βL, π,,  p,βL 
π,,  p, gL  q  p,  p,h, π,,  p, gL  q  p,  p,h 
π,,  mingp,, p,h G1  β   L  a  α mingp,, p,h  α mingp,, p,hH 
π,,  mingp,, p,h 1  β   L  a  αmin p,, p,  αmin p,, p, 
π,,  p,βL, π,,  p,βL 
π,,  p, gL  q  p,  p,h, π,,  p, gL  q  p,  p,h 
π,,  p, G1  β   L  a  αp,  αp,H 
π,,  p,1  β   L  a  αp,  αp, 
Since it is a two stage game, we use backward induction to solve for both firms’ 
second stage prices and then the first stage prices. For each firm there exists a unique 
set of solutions. Therefore there exists a unique pure strategy sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium.  Firm 1 and firm 2’s prices (pd,) are as follow: 
p,  13 3Lβ  3L    q  , p2,1  13 3Lβ  3L    q   
p1,2  13 6L  3βL  3L   6a   q   2α  
p2,2  13 6L  3βL  3L   6a   q   2α  
When q=0, the two firms are symmetric, their optimal prices are symmetric as 
well.  
Without loss of generality, we normalize L=1. Next we compare firms’ prices, 
profits, consumer surplus and social surplus under single pricing strategy with those 
under intertemporal pricing strategy. Since we have five parameters in the model, 
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without assigning parameters values, they are too complicated to compare. Therefore 
we assume the two firms are symmetric and there is no demand shock. By these 
assumption, we can set q  0, a  0. We denote pp, as the firm’s high price in the 
intertemporal pricing subtracting firm’s price in single pricing strategy; pp, as the 
firm’s low price in intertemporal pricing subtracting firm’s single price; πp as every two 
periods firm’s profit under intertemporal pricing subtracting firm’s profit under single 
pricing; csp as consumer surplus difference and defined in the same way. We have, 
 pp,  ¨.=¨©=¨ª¨=©ª¨=ª¨ , pp,   ¨.=¨©=¨ª¨=©ª¨=ª¨=ª   
πp  2 ¨.=¨©=¨ª¨=©ª.¨=ª¨=ª¨ , csp  4 «©=¨¨.=¨©=¨ª¨=©ª¨=ª¨=ª¨  
Proposition 2: When e  0, and   0 firms’ profits and  social surplus increase 
with intertemporal pricing strategy under SLPG, and consumer surplus decreases with 
intertemporal pricing strategy under SLPG. The single price without SLPG is between 
the high price and low price under SLPG.  
Since α  1, proposition 2 is easy to see. 
We can look at a numerical example. Setting q  0, a  0, β  ?  ,    ?, and 
α  2, the profits, consumer surplus, social surplus and prices are described in Table 
IV.1. This table shows that profits and social surplus increase under SLPG; consumer 
surplus decreases under SLPG; and the single price without SLPG is between the high  
price and low price under SLPG. 
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IV.2.4 Extend to dynamic game 
Next we develop a dynamic model based on the two-period specific model. There 
are infinite periods in the model. The two firms are symmetric and there is no demand 
shock. In each period, firms decide their prices simultaneous and independently. 
Therefore each firm doesn’t know its competitor’s current price when they decide their 
price, but they know all prices before current period. Firms will match its own price one 
period after sale.  
In each period, new consumers enter the market and exist in the market for two 
periods. Consumer type, fraction, and demand are the same as those of the specific two-
period model. Consumer will only make purchase in the period they enter the market 
(first period). In the second period, low type consumer can request price match if pri e
is lowered. Therefore, in each period, there exist two kinds of consumers in the market: 
old and new. The old consumers who entered the market in the last period will not make 
a purchase, but the low type consumers may request a price match. The new consumers 
who enter the market in current period may make a purchase. When they enter the 
market, consumers have complete information about firm pricing for the two periods 
they exist in the market. For example, consumers entering the market in period t know 
both firms’ price in that period (period t) and the following period (t+1). Since low type 
may request price if price is lowered in following period, when they make purchasing 
decision, they will not only consider firms’ prices in period t but also prices in period 
t+1. 
Firms choose optimal pricing strategy to maximize their profits over time. Firms 
have complete information about consumer fractions and demand parameters. Therefore 
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if their price is lowered in period t+1 comparing to period t, they know how many low 
type consumers will request price match and pay the actual price of b=, and they will 
take this into account when they choose the optimal pricing strategy. 
Firms try to maximize their profits. Since two firms are symmetric, we can write 
out firm 1’s profit and firm 2’s profit is similar. We denote firm 1’s profit from type j 
consumers in period t as π,,, firm 1’s price in period t as p,. Then we can write firm 
1’s profits in three different conditions as follow: 
First, p,=  p,  p,, then in period t, firm 1 tries to maximize its profit 
π,, which can be expressed as follow: 
π,,  π,,  π,,  π,, 
π,,  p,βL, π,,  p, gL  p,  p,h, 
π,,  p, G1  β   L  αp,  α mingp,, p,=hH 
Second, p,  p, and p,  p,=, then firm 1 price in period t has no effect 
on low type consumers in that period, therefore, in period t firm 1 will set price to 
maximize its profit from high and medium type consumers. We have π,, as follow:  
π,,  π,,  π,, 
π,,  p,βL, π,,  p, gL  p,  p,h, 
Third, p,  p, and p,  p,=, then firm 1 price in period t has no effect on 
low type consumers in that period but will decide the demand of low type from last 
period, therefore firm 1 will set price to maximize its profit from low type of last period 
and high and medium type of this period. We have π,,? as follow: 
89 
 
π,,?  π,,  π,,  π,, 
π,,  p,βL, π,,  p, gL  p,  p,h, 
π,,  p, G1  β   L  αp,  α mingp,, p,hH 
Fourth, p,  p, and p,  p,=, then firm 1 price in that period will not 
only decide its profit from current period consumers but also the low type from last 
period. We have π,,D as follow: 
π,,?  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,, 
π,,  p,βL, π,,  p, gL  p,  p,h, 
π,,  p, G1  β   L  αp,  α mingp,, p,=hH 
π,,  p, G1  β   L  αp,  α mingp,, p,hH 
We then solve for firm optimal strategies.  
Proposition 3: In the dynamic game, one optimal strategy is to charge a high 
price in one period and a low price in the following period, and repeat this price 
scheme, in which 
b    ¡  ¢¢ ,  b=  ¬  2  ¡  ¢¢  2  
Proof. See Appendix. 
Since there is no disturbance, each firm charges the same high price and low price 
for each two periods. Then each firm’s current price change equals to the reverse of its 
previous price change (coefficient is negative one). If the parameters ( o  ) are non 
constant but highly stable, then each firm’s high price and low price will be highly 
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stable for every periods. We would observe that the correlation between each firm’s 
current price change and its previous price change is not negative one but close to 
negative one. As a consequence, each firm’s price changes may show a cyclical pri e 
fluctuation over time. Specifically, a firm may charge a high price in one period, and a 
low price in the following period, then high price, low price and so on. As a 
consequence, we will observe a more frequent price adjustment over time.61
Usually, the two firms in the market are not exactly symmetric (e  0). We 
therefore allow e  0 and explore to what degree each firm’s price change is affected 
by its competitor’s price change; we use firm 1 for example. Since firm 1’s period t 
price is set to maximize its profits from group 1 consumers, and its period t+1 price is 
set to maximize its profits from group 2 consumers; we can solve its period t and t+1 
optimal price as a function of firm 2’s price. We have: 
,b  >  I.,­ ,  where  >  ®<=<¯=¯°¯  
,b=  ±  I.,­56 ,  where ±  <®<<¯=¯°¯=:  
 Δ  ±  >  I.,­56I.,­  ±  >   Δ 
From above equation, we can see when there is no other disturbance, the 
correlation between firm 1 price change and firm 2 price change is half. However, since 
these two firms move simultaneous and independently, it’s not proper to say firm 2 
price change causes firm 1 price change or vice verse. When there is other disturbance 
(for example, demand shock), but the disturbance is relatively small, we would expect 
                                                
61 This is consistent with the findings in Chen and Liu (2007) 
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the coefficient to be close to one half. Overall, both firms’ prices will move t  the same 
direction, either increase or decrease. 
IV.3. Empirical evidence 
To test our theoretical model, we collected weekly online price data from Best 
Buy and Circuit City. Best Buy and Circuit City were the largest two electronic 
products retailers in the country during the period of collecting data, and both 
companies adopt a SLPG policy within 30 days after sale62. Further, these two 
companies competed directly against each other for the period of analysis63. In the next 
section, we will describe our data first and then propose our empirical model and results.  
IV.3.1 Data description 
We have weekly price observations, rebate values if there are any, and shipping 
rates recorded every Sunday from Best Buy online and Circuit City online. The 
observations were collected between March 2nd 2008 and Jan 11th 2009, which is a total 
of 46 weeks64. There are total of 49 different products in our data set, covering the 
following nine major categories: mouse, MP3 player, printer, router, TV, SD card, d ta 
storage device65, digital camera, and camcorder. For each category, we record two sub-
categories of products; the first sub-category consists of low end products or mainly
                                                
62 Best Buy’s policy has changed over time. Currently as stated on their website, for computer, 
monitors, notebook computers, projectors, camcorders, digital cameras, and radar detectors the SLPG 
period is 14 days, for all other products except software, movies, music and video games, the period is 30 
days. 
63 Shares of Best Buy were up almost 9 percent the afternoon of January 16th 2009 after Circuit 
City claimed that it would liquidate all of its 567 U.S. stores. 82 percent of Circuit City’s domestic stores 
are within 5 miles of a Best Buy. 
64 We do not have observation on June 22nd 008 though. 
65 For this category, we choose flash drive and external hard disk drive.  
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products for home use; while the other sub-category consists of high end products or 
products for business and professional use. Within each sub-category, we include two or 
three products. For example, for the mouse category, we use Logitech optical mice s 
the low end product, recording the prices of LX3, LX5, and LX7; and Logitech laser 
mice as the high end product including VX Revolution, MX Revolution, and MX Air. 
For printer category, we use All-In-One inkjet printers as our home use products, while 
laser black-white printers as business use products. Not all products exist in the market 
for the whole 46 weeks, and we do not have data for all products on June 22nd 2008, so 
this is an unbalanced panel data with a gap. For 12 products we collected data for the 
entire period of 45 weeks, while for two products we have only 6 weeks of data 
collected over time. The average number of observations per product over time is about 
28.33. We only use the data in the regression when we have prices from both companies 
at the same week, and we have 1339 pairs of prices from Best Buy and Circuit City. 
Among these 1339 pairs, in 535(39.96%) of them Best Buy charges higher price than 
Circuit City; in 427(31.89%) of them Circuit City charges higher price; and in the 
remaining 377(28.16%) pairs they charge the same price. This indicates Best Buy’s 
price is slightly more likely to be higher than Circuit City within our observations. A 
positive price change means the price increased from last period; a negative price 
change means the price decreased. Table 2 is a summary of the price change in Best 
Buy and Circuit City. 
From the table 2 we can see that prices are fluctuating consistently over time. 
Moreover, the price change is not monotonically decreasing over time: about one fif h 
of the time prices increased and about one fourth of the time prices decreased. The 
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reason we observe more decreasing than increasing prices may be due to depreciation in 
product value over time caused by either cost reduction or new products entering the 
market. A comparison across stores indicates that Circuit City’s prices have less 
fluctuation than Best Buy’s prices.  
IV.3.2 Estimation 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to investigate the negative relationship 
within each firm’s own price change. In the empirical model, we have the following 
notations:  
Ṕ ,: Best Buy′s price in period week t 
P¹,: Circuit City′s price in period week t 
∆Ṕ ,  Ṕ ,  Ṕ , 
∆P¹,  P¹,  P¹, 
           Due to firm’s SLPG policy, each firm’s price is a function of its previous price
and its competitor’s current price and previous price. Since each company adopt a 
SLPG 30 days after sale, which is approximately 4 weeks. We have66: 
Ṕ ,  β»,´  β,´P¹,  β,´P¹,  β?,´P¹,  βD,´Ṕ ,  β¼,´Ṕ ,  β½,´Ṕ ,?
 ε´, 
P¹,  β»,¹  β,¹Ṕ ,  β,¹Ṕ ,  β?,¹Ṕ ,  βD,¹P¹,  β¼,¹P¹,  β½,¹P¹,?  ε¹, 
Since our interest is the relationship among price changes, we take the difference 
of period t and period t-1 for each firm’s model, and get our two regression models are67: 
                                                
66 Later, we will show how we chose the optimal number of lag terms. 
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∆Ṕ ,  β»,´¿  β,´∆P¹,  β,´∆P¹,  β?,´∆P¹,  βD,´∆Ṕ ,  β¼,´∆Ṕ ,
 β½,´∆Ṕ ,?  ∆ε´, 
∆P¹,  β»,¹¿  β,¹∆Ṕ ,  β,¹∆Ṕ ,  β?,¹∆Ṕ ,  βD,¹∆P¹,  β¼,¹∆P¹,
 β½,¹∆P¹,?  ∆ε¹, 
 We also include a set of time dummy variables to capture the hidden demand shock or 
other effect that may affect firm’s price change. Since the model estimates price change 
over price change, the price differencing process cancels the product individual effects. 
This allows us to estimate the model via pooled OLS. Next, we estimate our model with 
pure price change first, and then as a robustness check we estimate our model with 
effective price change, in which the price are calculated from pure price minus possible 
rebates value plus possible shipping rates, and estimate pure price model with a relative 
price indicator.  
Estimation with pure price change 
Our model is estimated under three different setups: without time dummies, with 
time dummies for certain periods68 69, and with all time dummies. We discuss the model 
selection process for model with all dummies in detail here. And for models with no 
dummy or part dummies, the process is similar and will be discussed briefly.  
In order to select the optimal price difference lags, we first estimate the model 
with different lags and then compute the corresponding Akaike Information Criterion 
                                                                                                                                               
67 We include a constant because the prices of electroni  products usually decrease over time. 
68 We include time dummies from Oct 26th 2008 to Jan 11th 2009. 
69 The reason we include time dummies for this period is that on Nov. 3rd, Circuit City closed its 
155 brick and mortar stores; and on Jan 16th, Circuit City closed all its stores, including online store. 
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(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Table 3 and table 4 show the AIC and 
BIC scores of corresponding models.  
From table 3 we can see that AIC scores and BIC scores choose different models 
to estimate Best Buy’s price change. Comparing to AIC, the way the BIC score is 
computed puts more penalties on additional independent variable when the time 
dimension is large. In that sense, BIC usually favors a more parsimonious model. When 
the sample size is large, due to the asymptotic property of BIC, it usually otperforms 
AIC; but when the time dimension is small, BIC may over penalize for the additional 
independent variable. And in that case, AIC outperforms BIC. Here, for two reasons we 
choose the model indicated by BIC. First, a general belief is that including fewer
independent variables will make the model more efficient. Second, from the IO 
Economist point of view, if Best Buy wants to response to Circuit City’s price change, 
the effect of a change implemented three weeks later is expected to be small. We 
suspect that it may be too late to have significant effect on market. Based on these 
considerations, we choose the fourth model. 
Table 4 shows AIC and BIC scores for Circuit City model. Both AIC and BIC 
procedures point to the selection of the fourth model. Therefore both regression models 
lead to the selection of three lags of its own price changes and two lags of its 
competitor’s price changes.  
For models without time dummy variables and with partial time dummy variables, 
we have similar results to those of models with full set of time dummy variables70. In 
Best Buy model, AIC and BIC point to the selection of different models, as we 
                                                
70 AIC and BIC scores are reported in parentheses in table 3 and table 4. 
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discussed before, we choose the model with lowest BIC score. In Circuit City model, 
both AIC and BIC point to the selection of model with three lags of Circuit City’s price 
changes and two lags of Best Buy’s price changes.  
Table 5 gives results for pooled OLS estimation for Best Buy’s pure price 
changes, and Table 6 gives results for pooled OLS estimation for Circuit City’s pure 
price changes. From our estimation results presented in table 5 and table 6, we can se  
there is no qualitative difference among these three71. The coefficients on price changes, 
which we focus on, are qualitatively the same and quantitatively close. Therefore we 
will focus our discussion on the model with part dummies. From the results we can see 
that each company’s price change is significantly negatively correlated wi h its own 
previous three weeks price changes, and positively correlated with the competit r’s 
current and previous price change.  
For model estimating Best Buy’s price changes, the coefficient for one laggd 
Best Buy’s price change is -0.702 which means on average if Best Buy’s price was 
increased by one dollar last week, then this week Best Buy will lower its price by about 
seventy cents. It’s not exactly negative one as theory predicted, but considering that the 
one period in theory is actually four weeks in empirical analysis, thus Best Buy may 
lower its price gradually, and the summation of all lagged coefficients is close to 
negative one (-1.167)72, the empirical findings are at some degree consistent with 
theoretical prediction.73 The coefficient for current Circuit City’s price change is 
                                                
71 Except the constant and some time dummies, which are not our primary interests. 
72 At 1% significance level we fail to reject the null that it equals to -1. 
73 Calculated impulse response from four weeks ago shock is 0.013, this mean four weeks ago 
price change doesn’t have very large effect on current price change. One explanation is that firms are 
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0.43074, which means the price change correlation between Best Buy and Circuit is 
0.43075. This is also at some degree consistent with our theory prediction. Best Buy’ 
price change is more affected by its own previous changes than Circuit City’s price 
changes. For higher lags, the scale of the coefficients decrease, which means last week’s 
price change has a larger effect on current price change than that of the week before last 
week.  
Circuit City’s price change follows the same pattern as Best Buy’s. The difference 
is the coefficients are smaller. This indicates that Circuit City’s current price is affected 
less by its previous price changes and Best Buy’s price changes. This is, to some degree, 
consistent with our observation in the data description that Circuit City’s price is less 
volatile. The time dummy coefficients are not significant for most dates except three 
dates for Best Buy and one date for Circuit City listed in the table. The three significant 
dummy coefficients76 for Best Buy indicates Best Buy’s price was increased in these 
three weeks, which is not caused by its own previous price change nor Circuit City’s 
price change. However all these three price increases are consistent wth Circuit City’s 
problems in these periods. On November 3rd 2008, Circuit City announced it plans to 
close 155 stores and lay off 17 percent of its workforce in the U.S., the dummy 
                                                                                                                                               
more likely to response to a price change in the first three weeks, rather than wait until the last week of 
price matching period (30 days).  
74 At 1% significance level, we fail to reject the null that it equals to 0.5. 
75 In the OLS estimation, since the coefficients of cmpetitor current price change are significant 
in both model (Best Buy and Circuit City), it’s not clear whether Circuit City price change causes Best
Buy price change or vice verse. However, as later we will see, the coefficient of competitor current price 
change is significant in Circuit City model but not in Best Buy model. In that case, it means Circuit City 
may decide its price according to Best Buy price, but Best Buy doesn’t decide its price based on Circuit 
City price. One possible explanation is Best Buy has a larger market share, therefore it has larger market 
power and plays as a leader in the market. 
76 In model with part dummies, two more dummies for Nv 16th and 23rd are negative significant 
at 5% level. This may because Best Buy lowered its pr ce for the coming Thanksgiving and Black Friday.  
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coefficient for November 2nd indicates Best Buy’s price was increased in that week. 
Exactly one week later, Circuit City filed for bankruptcy protection. The dummy 
coefficient for one day before that indicates Best Buy’s price increased again in that 
week. On January 16th 2009, Circuit City said it failed to find a buyer and will liquidate 
its 567 U.S. stores. Our result indicates that two weeks before that Best Buy increased 
its price. The only significant dummy for Circuit City’s price change is for November 
16th 2008, which is the following Sunday after it filed the bankruptcy protection.  
Although the Hausman specification test suggests using pooled OLS estimation, 
we still present the instrumented variable estimation results here.77 For Best Buy model, 
∆P¹,? is used as an instrumented variable for the potentially endogenous variable ∆P¹,; 
and for Circuit City model, ∆Ṕ ,? is used as an instrumented variable for the 
potentially endogenous variable ∆Ṕ ,. Let’s look at the Best Buy model first: In all three 
models, Best Buy’s price change is still negatively correlated with its previous price 
changes, but at a higher degree compared to pooled OLS estimation. However, in IV 
estimation, Circuit City’s price changes have no effect on Best Buy’s price changes. 
Since Best Buy is the largest firm in the electronic products retail market, this means 
Best Buy plays as a leader in the market. It decides its price not based on its competitor 
price. One noticeable point here is that the R2 is much smaller than that of the pooled 
OLS. This may suggest that IV estimation doesn’t fit the framework very w ll. IV 
estimation for the Circuit City model pretty much yields the same results as pooled OLS 
with two exceptions. First, the coefficients on price changes have a larger scale in IV 
estimation. Second, constant and time dummies are not significant in all three modelsin 
                                                
77 Table 7 and Table 8. 
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IV estimation. Circuit City price change is still significantly correlated with Best Buy 
current price change. This indicates Circuit City may play as a follower in that market. 
Estimation with effective price change and with indicator 
For robustness check we also calculate the effective price which is the retail price 
minus rebates78 plus shipping rates. We then calculate the price changes and follow AIC 
and BIC scores to select the proper estimation model. Table 9 and Table 10 show that 
both AIC and BIC lead to the selection of the estimation models with the same lags as 
that of the pure price change estimation. Since we still estimate a price difference model, 
the product individual effects are cancelled out when differencing the prices; we can 
estimate the model again via pooled OLS.  
We first estimate the model under three different setups via pooled OLS. The 
estimation results are reported in table 11 and table 12. Comparing these results with the 
model with pure prices, the relationship between price changes are qualitatively the 
same in both the Best Buy and Circuit City models. This confirms our claim that each 
firm’s price change is negatively related to its previous price changes and positively 
related to its competitor’s price changes. Quantitatively, the effect o  previous price 
changes on current price change is smaller in models with the effective price compared 
to the models with pure price. The major difference is in the dummy coefficients in the
Best Buy model including all dummies. For November 2nd 2008, the dummy coefficient 
is not significant in the effective price estimation anymore; one possible exp anation is 
that in that week, Best Buy increased the prices but at the mean time it offered discount 
shipping rates. Considering that one day later Circuit City closed its 155 stores, this 
                                                
78 When there is no rebate, this is zero. 
100 
 
eases the competition at brick and mortar places but not online. Therefore Best Buy had 
an incentive to increase the regular price face by consumers at the brick and mortal 
store; and at the same time it lowered its shipping rates to keep its delivered price the 
same for online shoppers.  For November 9th 08, the dummy coefficient is still 
significant and positive, but with a larger coefficient in the effective price estimation. 
For November 16th and 23rd 2008, the dummy coefficients are significant and negative 
in effective price estimation, but not significant in the pure price estimation. Since the 
effective price is the price including shipping rates and rebates, this may be explain d 
by either a decreasing in shipping rate or an increasing in rebate amount. An 
examination at the shipping rates and rebates shows that the decrease in shipping rates 
can explain the significant negative dummy coefficients for these dates. Th  average 
shipping rate drops from $12.13 on November 9th to $2.80 on 16th and $1.96 on 23rd. 
One possible explanation is that since Circuit City has filed for bankruptcy protection, 
Best Buy may expect liquidation by Circuit City and thus an intensified online 
competition. In response it lowered its shipping rates and thus the delivery price for 
online shoppers. For January 4th 09, the dummy coefficient is negative and significant at 
5% level in pure price model but insignificant in effective price model. By examining 
the rebates and shipping rates, there is no evidence to support that the difference is 
caused by these two factors. This difference is still an open question, but does not affect 
our main results. The dummy coefficient in Circuit City model is qualitatively 
consistent between the pure price model and effective price model. Looking at Circui
City’s shipping policy, we find that the shipping rates for Circuit City were very
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consistent over time. It offered free shipping for orders over $24.99, and there is almost 
no change in shipping rates for orders under $24.99.     
IV estimation results are reported in Table 13 and Table 14. In Table 13, all three 
Best Buy models show that Circuit City’s price changes have no significant effec  on 
Best Buy’s price changes. Moreover, the model with all dummies indicates more 
dummy coefficients are significant compared to other estimation results. In Table 14, 
Circuit City model doesn’t present any qualitative difference on the pricechange 
coefficients. Nevertheless, each company’s price change is still sign ficantly correlated 
with its previous price changes.  
Next, based on the pure price model, we add a relative price indicator as 
independent variable. The relative price indicator is generated as follow: 
  À 1, Á ,b  #,b 1, Á ,b  #,b0, ÂÃÄÅÄ Æ, 
where ,bis Best Buy last week price, #,b is Circuit City last week price. 
We estimate the model with no time dummy variable, and results are reported in 
Table 15. As we can see, there is no qualitative difference between the model with 
indicator and without indicator.  
Overall, the empirical evidence provides some investigation into our theory, but 
we have to point out the limitation here that the empirical analysis is not very rigorous. 




The traditional intertemporal pricing literature usually predicts a monotonic price 
decrease. In the real world, however, we usually observe price fluctuations. Existing 
literature on low price guarantee (LPG) typically focuses on competition amg stores 
and not over time. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model using SLPG to explain 
the price fluctuation over time. In a theoretical model, we show that in equilibrium 
firms use SLPGs and intertemporal pricing strategies. This will cause price fluctuations 
over time. By examine a specific model, we find that when firms are symmetric and the 
low type consumers’ demand respond to both firms prices at the same degree, firms’ 
profits and social surplus increase with SLPG, but consumer surplus decreases with 
SLPG. Moreover, if we assume the parameters are constant over time, a firm’s one 
period price change is negatively correlated with its previous period price change (-1), 
and positively correlated with its competitor’s current price change (1/2). With weekly 
data collected from Best Buy and Circuit City, we find that there is a negativ  
correlation between each firm price change and its previous periods price changes. An 
interesting empirical extension is to do a comparison between industry with SLPG and 
industry without SLPG. Future work could be done in this direction. If the work can 
show the industry without SLPG doesn’t embrace this negative correlation between 




Proof of Proposition 1. 
We first denote as the optimal high price in the intertemporal pricing strategy, 
¬ as the optimal low price in the intertemporal pricing strategy, and ¥ as the optimal 
price in the single pricing strategy.  Therefore we have 
  1 ÆÇ,6IÇ In+IÇ,È  0,        2  ÆÇ,.IÇ IÇ+IÇ,É  0,       3   ÆÇIÇIÇ+IÇ,Ê  0 
Since ,  Ë,  Ë,Ì, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
Ë,  Ë,Ì  |Ë,Ì| ,  0 }  ,  Ë,  Ë,ÌÍ|Ë,Ì| Í
 
Similar from equation (2) and equation (3) we have  
,¬  Ë,  Ë,Ì  2Ë,¬Í|Ë,Ì| Í  2 Í|Ë,¬| Í
 
p,¥  Ë,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬Í|Ë,Ì| Í  Í|Ë,¬| Í
 
From condition 3 we have 
,  Ë,  Ë,ÌÍ|Ë,Ì| Í
 Ë,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬2 Í|Ë,Ì| Í
 Ë,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬Í|Ë,Ì| Í  Í|Ë,¬| Í
 ,¥ 
gË,  Ë,Ìh Í|Ë,¬| Í  Ë,¬ Í|Ë,Ì| Í 
} gË,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬h Í|Ë,¬| Í  Ë,¬ ÎÍ|Ë,Ì| Í  Í|Ë,¬| ÍÏ 
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} gË,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬h ÎÍ|Ë,Ì| Í  2 Í|Ë,¬| ÍÏ
 gË,  Ë,Ì  2Ë,¬h ÎÍ|Ë,Ì| Í  Í|Ë,¬| ÍÏ 
} ,¥  Ë,  Ë,Ì  Ë,¬Í|Ë,Ì| Í  Í|Ë,¬| Í
 ,¬  Ë,  Ë,Ì  2Ë,¬Í|Ë,Ì| Í  2 Í|Ë,¬| Í
 
So far, we have shown that ,  ,¥ and ,¥  ,¬, and from condition 2 we 
have ÆÇ,6IÇ IÇ+IÇ,Ê  0; therefore when firms adopt SLPG, it can deviate to increase its 
profit by increase its first period price a infinite small amount and keep its second 
period price the same. By doing this, firm can increase its first period profit and keep its 
second period profit the same. Therefore, when firms can adopt SLPG, it will always 
deviate from the single pricing strategy to intertemporal pricing strategy.  
Proof of Proposition 3. 
We prove proposition 3 is an equilibrium by checking deviation. If no firm will 
deviate from the equilibrium pattern, then the high-low pricing schedule is an 
equilibrium. Since the two firms are symmetric, we only need to show one firm has no 
incentive to deviate. Without loss of generality, we look at firm 1. 
For any period in the dynamic game, firm 1 sets its price ,Ð to maximize its 
profit as: 
,Ð  ,,ÐÐ  ,Ì,ÐÐ  ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð=  ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð 
As a preliminary to the proof, we define two equilibrium prices under specific 
conditions that will be met later in the proof. 
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Suppose both firms follow the high-low pricing schedule, and assume that in 
period T firm 1 charges high price. Therefore we have Ð  Ð, and Ð  Ð=. 
When Ð  Ð, period T-1 low type consumers cannot request price match in 
period T, therefore their profits are determined by Ð, and ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð is 
zero in ,Ð. When Ð  Ð=, period T low type consumers will request price match in 
period T+1, therefore their profits are determined by Ð=, and ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð= is 
zero in ,Ð.  
Overall, firm 1 profit in period T can be simplified as: 
π,Ò  π,Ò,  π,,Ò  πd,,Ò, 
Firm 1 corresponding optimal price in period T is: 
,Ð  , such that Æ6,Ó,6I6 I6+IÈ  0. 
Alternatively, suppose it charges a low price, and thus Ð  Ð, and 
Ð  Ð=. Therefore ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð and ,¬,ÐÐ|Ð  Ð= are not zero 
in ,Ð. Overall firm 1 profit in period T can be simplified as: 
π,Ò  π,Ò,  πÒ,,Ò  π,,Ò  π,,Ò  π,,Ò, 
and firm 1 corresponding optimal price in period T is:  
,Ð  ¬, such that Æ6,Ó,.I6 I6+IÉ  0. 
When firm 1 chooses ¬ to maximize π,, it has to consider two groups of low 
type consumers; whereas when it chooses  to maximize π,, it only considers the 
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high and medium type consumers. Since low type consumer demand is more elastic, we 
have ¬  .  
To prove Proposition 3, we examine any two periods for firm 1, namely period t 
and period t+1. Before period t we assume firm 1 chooses SLPG and the high-low 
pricing schedule, and firm 1 price in period t-1, ,b  ¬. After period t+1 firm 1 
chooses SLPG and the high-low pricing schedule. Firm 1’s price in period t+2, ,b= 
.  
Next, we provide a road map for the remaining proof. We first show that these 
two periods can be separated from their previous and following periods, and thus can be 
analyzed separately. We then use similar analysis in the two-period specific game to 
find the optimal strategies for firms. 
In order to show these two periods can be separated from the previous and 
following periods, we need to show first that ,b  ,b, and thus firm 1 period t-1 
profit is unrelated to its period t price and second that ,b= $ ,b= and thus firm 1 
period t+1 profit is unrelated to its period t+2 price. 
We first show that ,b  ,b. In period t, firm 1 can choose ,b  ,b or 
,b  ,b. If  ,b  ,b, then the low type consumers who made purchase in 
period t-1 will request price match in period t. We have two situations depending on the 
relationship between ,b and ,b=. 
First ,b $ ,b=, then in period t firm chooses the optimal price to maximize the 
total profits from its current period customers and last period low type customer . W  
have,   
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π,  π,,  π,,  π,,  π,,. 
As we have shown the optimal low price is ¬, therefore firm 1 will not choose a 
price lower than ¬, which is ,b  ,b  ¬.  
Second ,b  ,b=, then in period t firm 1 chooses the optimal price to 
maximize the total profits from its current period high and medium customers and last 
period low type customers. We have 
π,¿  π,,  π,,  π,, 
Firm 1 corresponding optimal price is ,b¿. Its last period price is ¬, which is 
chosen to maximize ,,b. Since π,, contains more low type consumers than π,¿, 
the corresponding optimal price ¬ should also be lower than ,b¿ (,b  ,b  ¬, 
and we have a contradiction here. 
Combining these two cases, we have ,b  ,b. Therefore, low type 
consumers in period t-1 will not request price match. Firm 1 period t price has no effect 
on its previous period consumers.  
We then show that ,b= $ ,b=. Let’s look at period t+1. In period t+1, firm 1 
can choose ,b= $ ,b= or ,b=  ,b=. If firm 1 chooses ,b=  ,b=, the low 
type consumers will request price match in the next period. We have two situations 
depending on the relationship between ,b= and ,b. 
First, if ,b=  ,b, then ,b= has no effect on low type consumers in period t, 
and since ,b=  ,b=, ,b=doesn’t determine the profit from low type consumers 
in period t+1 as well. Therefore, firm 1 chooses ,b=to maximize its period t+1 profit: 
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π,=  π,,=  πd,,=  π, 
The optimal price is , which is equal to ,b=. Therefore in this situation, 
,b=  ,b=.  
Second, if ,b=  ,b, then ,b= has effect on the low type consumers in 
period t, and since ,b=  ,b=, ,b=doesn’t determine the profit from low type 
consumers in period t+1. Therefore, firm 1 chooses ,b=to maximize its period t+1 
profit: 
π,=¿  π,,  π,,  π,,. 
The corresponding optimal price is ,b=¿. The period t+2 price is , which is 
chosen to maximize ,. Since π, contains no low type consumer compared to π,=¿, 
the corresponding optimal price  is higher than ,b=y . Therefore, we have ,b=  
,b=, which creats a contradiction. 
Combining these two cases, we have ,b= $ ,b=. Therefore, low type 
consumer in period t+1 will not request price a match in period t+2. Firm 1 period t+1 
profit is unrelated to period t+2 price. 
Overall, the price in period t has no effect on the price in period t-1, and the price 
in period t+2 price has no effect on the price in period t+1. Therefore, these two periods, 
t and t+1, can be looked at separately and consider the game in which these prices 
appear in a recurrent pattern. 
Next, we examine two periods of the dynamic game seperately. 
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In these two periods, firm 1 can either set ,b  ,b= or ,b $ ,b=. If firm 1 
set ,b $ ,b=, then period t+1 price has no effect on period t, therefore in each period, 
firm 1 chooses a price to maximize its profits from the customer of that period. Which 
is  
π  π,  π,  π,. 
This is equivalent to when there is not SLPG and firm adopts a single optimal 
price.  
If firm 1 set ,b  ,b=, then period t+1 price has an effect on period t. Firm 1 
chooses a price schedule to maximize its total profits from these two periods. Using the 
same functional form as in the two-period specific game in section IV.2.2.3., we have  
π  π,  π,=, 
π,  π,  π,,  πd,,, π,=  π,,=  π,,=  π,,=  π,,, 
π,,  p,βL,  π,,  p, gL  q  p,  p,h, 
π,,  p,= G1  β   L  a  αp,=  α mingp,, p,=hH , 
π,,=  p,=βL, π,,=  p,= gL  q  p,=  p,=h, 
π,,=  p,= G1  β   L  a  αp,  αp,=H. 
This is the same as in the specific two-period model. Firm 1 sets p, o maximize 
π,  π,,  π,, and p,= to maximize π,  π,,  π,,=  π,,=  π,,=.  
We calculate the first order conditions as follows: 
|,|,b  ¡  ¢g  ,b  ,bh  ¢,b, 
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6,.I6,­56  21  ¡  ¢  4,b=  2,b=  ¡  ¢,b=  ¢g 
,b=  ,b=. 
Using the first order conditions to derive an explicit expression of the optimal 
strategies, we get: 
,b    ¡  ¢¢ , ,b=  ¬  2  ¡  ¢¢  2 . 
The second order condition is negative definite. 
As we have already shown in Proposition 2, the profit from single pricing strategy 
is lower than the profit from intertemporal pricing strategy. Firm will deviat  from the 













Table IV.1. Comparison of single pricing and intertemporal pricinga 
 Single pricing strategy Intertemporal pricing strategy  0.4286 1.7436 
cs 2.6667v-1.0317 2.6667v-2.4444 
ss 1.3333v+0.6825 2.6667v+1.0427 
p 0.4286 2 
0.3077 
aAll numerical values are approximate to four decimal places. 
Table IV.2. Price statistics summary 
 Best Buy Circuit City 
Price Change Frequency Maximum Frequency Maximum 
Decrease 314 $500 295 $400 
The same 660  721  
Increase 277 $400 235 $800 
Total 1,251  1,251  
Price Range Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
 $9.99a $4199.99b $6.99c $4199.99d 
a SanDisk 1G SD card 
b,d Panasonic TV (model: 58PZ700U) 
c SanDisk 1G flash drive 
 
Table IV.3. AIC and BIC for Best Buy pure price model 


























a Models with all time dummy variables. 
b Models without time dummy variable. 





Table IV.4. AIC and BIC for Circuit City pure price model  
 
AIC BIC 




































a Models with all time dummy variables. 
b Models without time dummy variable. 



































Table IV.5. Pure Price Pooled OLS Estimation Results (Best Buy) 








∆z,b -0.693* (0.029) -0.702* (0.029)  -0.701* (0.029) 
∆z,b -0.353* (0.034) -0.349* (0.034)  -0.340* (0.035) 
∆z,b? -0.124* (0.028) -0.116* (0.028) -0.112* (0.028) 
∆z#,b 0.436* (0.030) 0.430* (0.030) 0.427* (0.030) 
∆z#,b 0.308* (0.030) 0.307* (0.030) 0.307* (0.030) 
∆z#,b 0.038 (0.028) 0.040 (0.028) 0.040 (0.028) 
Time dummiese    
11/02/08  
  19.045*** 
(9.767) 








   -22.476** 
(9.835)  
11/23/08  






(14.173) Ø 0.489 0.508 0.520 
Wald Test    ∆z,b  ∆z,b ∆z,b?  1 P>|t|=0.020 P>|t|=0.024  ∆z#,b  0.5 P>F=0.035 P>F=0.019  
aModel with no time dummy variable. 
bModel with part time dummy variables. 
cModel with all time dummy variables. 
dStandard errors are in parentheses. 
eOnly significant time dummies are reported. 








Table IV.6. Pure Price Pooled OLS Estimation Results (Circuit City)  
Variable ∆z#,b ∆z#,b ∆z#,b 
Constant 
  -2.316** 
(1.164) 




∆z,b 0.407* (0.027) 0.413* (0.028) 0.411* (0.028) 
∆z,b 0.203* (0.032) 0.204* (0.033) 0.199* (0.034) 
∆z,b    0.053*** (0.028)    0.051*** (0.027) 0.041 (0.029) 
∆z#,b -0.562* (0.026) -0.560* (0.027) -0.559* (0.027) 
∆z#,b -0.192* (0.030) -0.192* (0.031) -0.189* (0.031) 
∆z#,b? -0.078* (0.026) -0.075* (0.026) -0.071* (0.027) 
Time dummies    
11/16/08 
    23.413** 
(9.498) 
   23.513*** 
(13.583) Ø 0.412 0.418 0.429 


















Table IV.7. Pure Price IV Estimation Results (Best Buy) 








∆z,b -0.783* (0.072) -0.803* (0.082)  -0.817* (0.097) 
∆z,b -0.469* (0.091) -0.476* (0.102)  -0.486* (0.120) 
∆z,b? -0.203* (0.065) -0.198* (0.070)  -0.201** (0.078) 
∆z#,b -0.377 (0.557) -0.403 (0.599) -0.499 (0.699) 
∆z#,b -0.101 (0.282) -0.110 (0.302) -0.157 (0.352) 
∆z#,b -0.092 (0.096) -0.093 (0.102) -0.107 (0.118) 




    42.910*** 
(21.856) 
11/23/08  






(20.241) Ø 0.111 0.116 0.047 
First Stage ∆z#,b ∆z#,b ∆z#,b 
∆P¹,? -0.066** (0.029) -0.061** (0.029) -0.056** (0.030) 
F-statistics 65.56 23.69 10.33 
Wald Test    ∆z,b  ∆z,b ∆z,b?  1 P>|t|=0.036 P>|t|=0.05  ∆z#,b  0.5 P>F=0.115 P>F=0.131  












Table IV.8. Pure Price IV Estimation Results (Circuit City)  








∆z, 0.502* (0.158) 0.548* (0.171) 0.554* (0.179) 
∆z,b  0.270** (0.113)   0.301** (0.124)  0.301** (0.130) 
∆z,b 0.082 (0.055) 0.093 (0.059) 0.084 (0.061) 
∆z#,b -0.571* (0.030) -0.573* (0.032) -0.574* (0.033) 
∆z#,b -0.188* (0.031) -0.187* (0.031) -0.185* (0.032) 
∆z#,b? -0.078* (0.026) -0.075* (0.027) -0.071* (0.027) 
Time dummiesa    Ø 0.405 0.403 0.414 
First Stage ∆z, ∆z, ∆z, 
∆P´,? -0.170* (0.031) -0.162* (0.031) -0.157* (0.031) 
F-statistics 100.79 38.80 16.77 
Wald Test    ∆z¹,b  ∆z#,b ∆z#,b?  1 P>|t|=0.014 P>|t|=0.015  ∆z,b  0.5 P>F=0.9881 P>F=0.777  
a No dummy variable is significant in IV estimation. 










Table IV.9. AIC and BIC for Best Buy effective price model 
 AIC BIC 


























a Models with all time dummy variables. 
b Models without time dummy variable. 







Table IV.10. AIC and BIC for Circuit City effective price model 
 AIC BIC 






























a Models with all time dummy variables. 
b Models without time dummy variable. 





Table IV.11. Effective price Pooled OLS Estimation Results (Best Buy) 








∆z,b -0.652* (0.029) -0.664* (0.029)  -0.662* (0.029) 
∆z,b -0.365* (0.033) -0.362* (0.034)  -0.356* (0.034) 
∆z,b? -0.139* (0.028) -0.131* (0.028) -0.128* (0.029) 
∆z#,b 0.453* (0.033) 0.446* (0.033)  0.444* (0.033) 
∆z#,b 0.286* (0.033) 0.287* (0.033)  0.287* (0.033) 
∆z#,b 0.007 (0.031) 0.010 (0.030) 0.012 (0.031) 
Time dummies    
11/02/08  





   39.931** 
(15.258) 
11/16/08  
  -28.601* 
(10.746) 
  -33.006** 
(15.332) 
11/23/08  
  -27.966* 
(10.725) 
   -32.272** 
(15.218) 
1/04/08  
  28.143** 
(11.015)  Ø 0.456 0.481 0.493 










Table IV.12. Effective price Pooled OLS Estimation Results (Circuit City)  
Variable ∆z#,b ∆z#,b ∆z#,b 
Constant 
  -2.684** 
(1.175) 




∆z,b 0.359* (0.025) 0.367* (0.026) 0.365* (0.026) 
∆z,b 0.164* (0.029) 0.165* (0.030) 0.162* (0.031) 
∆z,b    0.053** (0.026)    0.050*** (0.027) 0.043 (0.027) 
∆z#,b -0.544* (0.026) -0.542* (0.027) -0.542* (0.027) 
∆z#,b -0.179* (0.031) -0.178* (0.031) -0.178* (0.031) 
∆z#,b? -0.070* (0.026)   -0.067** (0.027)  -0.063** (0.027) 
Time dummies    
11/16/08 
    25.050* 
(9.624) 
     24.270*** 
(13.744) Ø 0.400 0.406 0.418 













Table IV.13. Effective price IV Estimation Results (Best Buy) 




  -5.607** 
(2.758) 
  -26.843** 
(13.973) 
∆z,b -0.688* (0.055) -0.703* (0.061)  -0.706* (0.067) 
∆z,b -0.411* (0.067) -0.409* (0.074)  -0.409* (0.081) 
∆z,b? -0.176* (0.054) -0.166* (0.058)  -0.166* (0.060) 
∆z#,b 0.075 (0.470) -0.091 (0.491) 0.049 (0.542) 
∆z#,b 0.095 (0.238) 0.109 (0.247) 0.089 (0.273) 
∆z#,b -0.055 (0.083) -0.047 (0.086) -0.052 (0.094) 
Time dummies    
4/13/08   
    26.322*** 
(15.186) 
4/20/08   
   32.624** 
(14.238) 
4/27/08   
    25.971*** 
(15.413) 
6/01/08   
    26.941*** 
(15.339) 
6/15/08   
    27.245*** 
(15.537) 
10/05/08   
    30.233*** 
(16.938) 
11/02/08  










  -32.469** 
(12.945)  







(16.596) Ø 0.383 0.418 0.416 
First stage ∆z#,b ∆z#,b ∆z#,b 
∆P¹,? -0.069** (0.029) -0.064** (0.029) -0.060** (0.030) 
F-statistics 65.32 23.63 10.27 
Wald Test    ∆z,b  ∆z,b ∆z,b?  1 P>|t|=0.098 P>|t|=0.132  ∆z#,b  0.5 P>F=0.3654 P>F=0.0.4045  
a Other variables are exogenous presented in 2nd stage. 
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Table IV.14. Effective price IV Estimation Results (Circuit City)  








∆P´, 0.475* (0.138) 0.521* (0.149) 0.508* (0.155) 
∆P´,  0.238** (0.092)  0.267* (0.102)    0.256** (0.106) 
∆P´,    0.089*** (0.049)    0.097*** (0.053) 0.086 (0.054) 
∆P¹, -0.550* (0.028) -0.551* (0.028) -0.550* (0.029) 
∆P¹, -0.168* (0.033) -0.165* (0.034) -0.164* (0.034) 
∆P¹,?   -0.066** (0.027)   -0.061** (0.028) -0.058* (0.034) 
Time dummiesa    
10/12/08 
       26.740*** 
(14.321) 
10/19/08 
     35.794** 
(15.339) 
11/16/08 
  29.145* 
(10.547) 
   44.516** 
(17.200) R 0.387 0.385 0.400 
First Stage ∆z, ∆z, ∆z, 
∆P´,? -0.183* (0.031) -0.173* (0.031) -0.170* (0.032) 
F-statistics 89.12 35.27 15.20 
Wald Test    ∆z¹,b  ∆z#,b ∆z#,b?  1 P>|t|=0.001 P>|t|=0.001  ∆z,b  0.5 P>F=0.8570 P>F=0.8903  
a No dummy variable is significant in IV estimation. 



















Table. 15. Model with relative price indicator 




  -2.716** 
(1.158) 
∆z,b  0.415* (0.027) 
∆z,b -0.666* (0.029) 0.181* (0.032) 
∆z,b -0.337* (0.034)    0.043 (0.028) 
∆z,b? -0.117* (0.028)  
∆z#,b 0.448* (0.030)  
∆z#,b 0.290* (0.031) -0.531* (0.027) 
∆z#,b 0.028 (0.028) -0.173* (0.030) 




   6.146** 















Price discrimination has been and is being extensively studied. The development 
of technology, especially internet, has changed firms and consumers behavior 
significantly. With the development of technology, consumers can get abundant of 
information at a much lower cost.79 This change has effectively changed consumers’ 
behavior and firms’ competitive behavior. The study answers two changes brought by 
technology improvement at some degree. The first is coupon trading, which is hard to 
observe decades ago and ignored by IO literature, but now is becoming more and more 
popular and cannot be ignored anymore. The second is firms post-sale LPG. Existing 
literature usually focus on LPG among stores. But with the technology improvement, it 
is more and more easy for consumers to track price after purchase happens. Post-sale 
LPG thus is practically important in markets. 
The first essay, “Customer Poaching, Coupon Trading and Consumer Arbitrage”, 
incorporates consumer arbitrage by introducing coupon trading among consumers into 
coupon competition model. Specifically the essay assumes that a fraction of consumers 
are coupon traders who can trade coupons at a very low cost (normalized to zero). On 
the other side of the market, firms compete in regular prices, promotion depths, and 
promotion frequencies. The results show that when the fraction of coupon traders 
increases, firms respond by promoting less frequently and reducing the promotion depth. 
When the cost of distributing coupons increases, firms promote less frequently but with 
                                                
79 Some papers point out that current problem is information overload rather than information 
shortage. See Anderson and de Palma (2009) for example. 
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higher coupon face value. In both cases, competitions are released, and firms charge 
higher regular prices and get higher profits. Consumers are worse off since prices 
increase. The results are robust to several extensions including the introduction of 
coupon non-users and non-tradable coupons. Regarding to the extension of asymmetric 
firms, results are more complicated, but it has the same spirit of the symmetric 
benchmark model in the sense of that more coupon traders and higher coupon 
distribution cost reduce competition.  
The second essay, “Post-Sale Low Price Guarantees and Price Fluctuation”, 
examines firms’ SLPG policy and its effect on consumers purchasing behavior and 
firms’ competitive behavior. In the theoretical model, part of the consumers are 
assumed to have very low cost (normalized to zero) to request price match after sale. 
Knowing this, firms can adopt SLPG and intertemporal pricing policy to discriminate 
the consumers with high cost of requesting SLPG. In the empirical part, week price data 
from Best Buy and Circuit City are used to estimate each firm’s pricechanges. The 
empirical results indicate that each firm’s price change is significatly nd negatively 
correlated with its own previous price changes. This coincides with the theoretical 
model’s prediction, and thus supports the theoretical model at some degree. 
V.1. Limitations 
The limitations of the first essay arise from complexity of the model. Since the 
model has four endogenous variables, it is impossible to examine the model under a 
more general setting. The essay discusses several extensions based on the benchmark 
model. This, at some degree, may overcome the limitation.  
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The limitations of the second essay mainly come from the data. The sample size is 
not very large in terms of time dimension and products dimension. This may cause 
some skepticism about empirical results. The other shortage regarding to the data is th t 
there are only two firms. This may not be strong enough to claim that SLPG combining 
intertemporal pricing policy is a common strategy adopted by firms. Another issue s 
that since the data contains only firms with SLPG, I cannot do comparison between 
firms with SLPG and firms without SLPG. If I have data from firms with and without 
SLPG, and can observe the periodical price fluctuation in the firms with SLPG but not 
in the firms without SLPG, then I could be more confident about the theoretical results.  
V.2. Implications for Future Research 
In the strand of coupon trading literature, future studies could investigate 
consumers’ arbitrage behavior. Especially what factors may affect consumers’ 
willingness to trade coupon. Another extension could be instead of assuming the 
fraction of coupon traders exogenously, it is endogenously determined. These studies 
could provide useful information on firms’ promotion strategies.  
In the strand of SLPG and price fluctuation literature, future studies could start 
from a richer data set, especially data with prices from firms with SLPG and firms 
without SLPG. Another extension could be examining the difference between SLPG 




Overall, this study answers two questions brought by development of technology. 
The first essay shows that consumer arbitrage behavior has significant effect on irms’ 
promotion behavior, but it doesn’t change the fact that competition through couponing 
is a prisoner’s dilemma.  
The second essay shows that firms may use SLPG and intertemporal pricing 
policy to price discriminate part of the market. Low type consumers benefit from this 
strategy, but high type consumers hurts by this strategy. In the specific model, when 
firms are symmetric and the low type consumers’ demand respond to both firms prices 
at the same degree, firms’ profits and social surplus increase with SLPG, but cons mer 














Alba, J., Lynch, J., Weitz, B., Janiszewski, C., Lutz, R., Sawyer, A., and Wood, S. 
(1997) "Interactive Home Shopping: Consumer, Retailer, and Manufacturer Incentives 
to Participate in Electronic Marketplaces." Journal of Marketing 61, 38-53. 
Arbatskaya, M., Hviid, M. and Shaffer, G.(2006) “On the Use of Low-Price Guarantees 
to Discourage Price Cutting”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24, 
1139-1156 
Armstrong, M. (1999) “Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm”, Review of 
Economic Studies 66, 151-168.  
Anderson, S. and A. de Palma (2009) “Competition for Attention in the Information 
(Overload) Age,” Working paper.  
Andersons, S. and V. Ginsburgh (1999) “International pricing with costly consumer 
Arbitrage,” Review of International Economics 7, 126-139. 
Bakos, J.Y. (1991) "A Strategic Analysis of Electronic Marketplaces," MIS Quarterly 
15, 295-310. 
Bakos, J.Y. (1997) "Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic 
Marketplaces," Management Science 43, 1676-1692. 
Banks, J. and Moorthy, S. (1999) "A Model of Price Promotions with Consumer 
Search," International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 371-398. 
Bawa, K., Srinivasan, S.S., and Srivastava, R. K. (1997) " Coupon Attractiveness and 
Coupon Proneness: A Framework for Modeling Coupon Redemption," J urnal of 
Marketing Research 34, 517-525. 
Baylis, K. and Perloff, J. (2002) "Price Dispersion on the Internet: Good Firms and Bad 
Firms," Review of Industrial Organization 21, 305-324. 
Bester, H. and E. Petrakis (1996) “Coupons and oligopolistic price discrimination,”  
International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, 227-242. 
Brander, J. and P. Krugman (1983) “A ‘reciprocal dumping’ model of international 
trade,” Journal of International Economics 15, 313-321. 
Brown, J.R. and Goolsbee, A. (2002) "Does the Internet Make Markets More 




Brynjolfsson, E. and Smith, M.D. (2000) "Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of 
Internet and Conventional Retailers" Management Science 46, 563-585. 
Buckinx, W., Moons, E., Van Den Poel, D., and Wets, G. (2003)"Customer-Adapted 
Coupon Targeting Using Feature Selection", Working paper, University Gent.
Calzolari, G. and A. Pavan (2006) “Monopoly with resale,” RAND Journal of 
Economics 37, 362-375. 
Carlton, D. and J. Perloff (2005) “Modern Industrial Organization”, 4th edition, Addison 
Wesley.  
Chen, J and Q. Liu (2009) “Most-Favored Customer Clauses Facilitate Competition”, 
working paper 
Chen, Y. (1997) "Paying Customers to Switch." Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy 6, 877-897. 
Chevalier, J. and Goolsbee, A. (2002) "Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: 
Amazon and Barnes and Noble" NBER July.  
Chiang, R., and C. Spatt (1982) "Imperfect price discrimination and welfare," review of 
economic studies 49, 155-181. 
Clay, K., Krishnan, R., and Wolff, E. (2001) "Prices and Price Dispersion on the Web: 
Evidence from the Online Book Industry." Journal of Industrial Economics 49, 521-
539. 
Clemons, E.K., Hann, I., and Hitt, L. (2002) "Price Dispersion and Differentiation in 
Online Travel: An Empirical Investigation." Management Science 48, 534-549. 
Cooper, T. (1986) “Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion,” Rand 
Journal of Economics 17, 377-388. 
Corts, K. (1996) “On the Competitive Effects of Price-Matching Policies” International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 283-299. 
d'Aspremont, C., J. Gabszewicz, and J. Thisse (1979) "On Hotelling's Stability in 
Competition," Econometrica 17, 1145-1151. 
Deltas, G., A. Salvo and H. Vasconcelos (2008) “Welfare-enhancing, trade-restricting 
collusion in geographically separated markets with differentiated goods,” Working 
paper. 
DelVecchio, D. (2005) “Deal-Prone Consumers' Response to Promotion: The Effects o  
Relative and Absolute Promotion Value.” Psychology & Marketing 22, 373-391. 
129 
 
Dhar, S.K. and Raju, J.S. (1998) “The Effects of Cross-Ruff Coupons on Sales and 
Profits,” Management Science 44, 1501-1516. 
Diamond, P. (1987) "Consumer Differences and Prices in a Search Model," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 102, 429-436. 
Eaton, B. C., and R. Lipsey (1975) "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation 
Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," Review 
of Economic Studies 42, 27-49. 
Economides, N. (1986) "Minimal and Maximal Product Differentiation in Hotelling's 
Duopoly," Economic Letters 21, 67-71. 
Ekelund, R. (1970) "Price Discrimination and Product Differentiation in Economic 
Theory: An Early Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 268-278. 
Elmaghraby, W. and P. Keskinocak (2003) “Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of 
Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future 
Directions” Management Science 49, 1287-1309. 
Fong, Y. and Q. Liu (2009) “Loyalty rewards facilitate tacit collusion,” Working paper. 
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (2000) “Customer poaching and brand switching,” RAND 
Journal of Economics 31, 634-657. 
Goldman, M., H. Leland, and D. Sibley (1984) "Optimal Nonuniform Pricing," Review 
of Economic Studies 51, 305-320. 
Gonul, F. and Srinivasan, K. (1996) "Estimating the Impact of Consumer Expectations 
of Coupons on Purchase Behavior: A Dynamic Structural Model." Marketing Science 
15, 262-279. 
Grover, V. and Ramanlal, P. (1999) "Six Myths of Information and Markets: 
Information Technology Networks, Electronic Commerce, and the Battle for Consumer 
Surplus." MIS Quarterly 23, 465-496. 
Haile, P. (2003) “Auctions with private uncertainty and resale,” Journal of Economic 
Theory 108, 72-100. 
Hosken, D. and D. Reiffen (2004) “Patterns of Retail Price Variation,” RAND Journal 
of Economics 35, 128-146. 
Katz, M. (1987) "The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination in 
Intermediate Goods Markets," American Economic Review 77, 154-167. 
130 
 
Kocas, Cenk (2005) "A Model of Internet Pricing under Price-Comparison Shopping" 
International Journal of Electronic Commerce 10, 111-134. 
Lach, S. (2002)"Existence and Persistence of Price Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis." 
Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 433-444. 
Landsberger, M. and I. Meilijson (1985) “Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales 
Strategy under Incomplete Information” The RAND Journal of Economics 16, 424-430. 
Levin, Y., J. McGill and M. Nediak,  (2009) “Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of 
Strategic Consumers and Oligopolistic Competition”  Management Science 55, 32-46. 
Liu, Q. and K. Serfes (2004) “Quality of information and oligopolistic price 
discrimination,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 13, 671-702. 
Liu, Q. and K. Serfes (2006) “Customer information sharing among rival firms,” 
European Economic Review 50, 1571-1600. 
Logan, J. and R. Lutter (1989) “Guaranteed Lowest Prices: Do They Facilitate 
Collusion?” Economics Letters 31, 189-192. 
Lynch, J.G. and Ariely, D. (2000) "Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on 
Price, Quality, and Distribution." Marketing Science 19, 83-103. 
Manez, J.(2006) “Unbeatable Value Low-Price Guarantee: Collusive Mechanism or 
Advertising Strategy?” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 15, 143-166. 
Mittal, B. (1994) "An Integrated Framework for Relating Diverse Consumer 
Characteristics to Supermarket Coupon Redemption." Journal of Marketing Research 
31, 533-544. 
Moorthy, S. and R. Winter (2006) “Price-Matching Guarantees” The RAND Journal of 
Economics 37, 449-465. 
Moorthy, S. and X. Zhang (2006) “Price Matching by Vertically Differentiated 
Retailers: Theory and Evidence” Journal of Marketing Research 43, 156-167. 
Nair, H. (2007) “Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Forward-looking Consumers: 
Application to the US Market for Console Video-games” Quant Market Econ 5, 239-
292. 
Narasimhan, C. (1984) “A price discrimination theory of coupons,” Marketing Science 
3, 128-147. 
Nevo, A. and Wolfram, C. (2002) "Why do Manufacturers Issue Coupons? An 
Empirical Analysis of Breakfast Cereals." RAND Journal of Economics 33, 319-339. 
131 
 
Pan, X., Ratchford, B., and Shankar, V. (2002) "Can Price Dispersion in Online 
Markets Be Explained by Differences in E-Tailer Service Quality?" Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science 30, 433-445. 
Pigou, A. (1932) “The Economics of Welfare”, 4th Edition, London: Macmillan and Co. 
Phlips, L. (1983). The Economics of Price Discrimination. Cambridge University Press. 
Png, I.P.L. and D. Hirshleifer (1987) “Price Discrimination Through Offers to Match 
Price” The Journal of Business 60, 365-383. 
Png, I. (2001) “Managerial Economics”, 2nd edition, Malden: Blackwell Publishers.  
Rao, R. C. (1991) "Pricing and Promotions in Asymmetric Duopolies." Marketing 
Science 10, 131-144. 
Robinson, J. (1933). Economics of Imperfect Competition. London: Macmillan. 
Rodriguez, A. and L. Locay (2002) “Two models of Intertemporal Price Dscrimination” 
Journal of Economics 76, 261-278. 
Rosenthal, R. (1980). “A Model in which Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a 
Higher Price,” Econometrica 40, 1575-1579. 
Rustichini, A. and A. Villamil (1996) “Intertemporal Pricing in Markets with 
Differential Information” Economic Theory 8, 211-227. 
Salop, S. (1977) “The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion, and 
Price Discrimination,” Review of Economic Studies 44, 393-406. 
Salop, S., and J. Stiglitz (1982) “A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with 
Identical Agents,” American Economic Review 13, 1121-1130. 
Salop, S. (1986) “Practices that (credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination” in: 
Stiglitz, J. and Mathewson, S. eds., New Developments in the Analysis of Market 
Structure, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,  
Schmalensee, R. (1976) “A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly,” Review 
of Economic Studies 43, 493-507. 
Schnitzer, M. (1994) “Dynamic Duopoly  with Best-Price Clauses,” Rand Journal of 
Economics 25(1), 186-196. 
Shaked, A., and J. Sutton (1982) “Relaxing Price Competition through Product 
Differentiation,” Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. 
132 
 
Shaffer, G. and Z.J. Zhang (1995) “Competitive coupon targeting,” Marketing Science 
14, 395-415. 
Shaffer, G. and Z.J. Zhang (2000) “Pay to switch or pay to stay: Preference-based price 
discrimination in markets with switching costs,” Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy 9, 397-424. 
Shaffer, G. and Z.J. Zhang (2002) “Competitive one-to-one promotions,” Management 
Science 48, 1143-1160. 
Shilony, Y. (1977) “Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly,” Journal of Economic Theory 14, 203-
235. 
Smith, M.D., Bailey, J., and Brynjolfsson, E. (1999) "Understanding Digital Markets: 
Review and Assessment." Forthcoming Understanding the Digital Economy, MIT Press. 
Spulber, D. (1981) “Spatial Nonlinear Pricing,” American Economic Review 71, 923-
933. 
Stokey, N. (1979) “Intertemporal Price Discrimination” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 93, 355-371 
Stole, L. (1995) “Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly” Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy 4, 529-562 
Tirole, J. (1988) “The Theory of Industrial Organization”, Cambridge MA: The MIT
Press. 
Varian, H. (1980) “A Model of Sales,” American Economic Review 75, 651-659. 
Varian, H. (1985) “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,” American Economic 
Review 75, 870-975. 
Walter, Z., Gupta, A., and Su, B. (2006) "The Sources of On-Line Price Dispersion 
across Product Types: An Integrative View of On-Line Search Costs and Price 
Premiums." International Journal of Electronic Commerce 11, 37-62. 
Zheng, C. (2002) “Optimal auction with resale,” Econometrica 70, 2197-2224. 
 
 
 
